Page 75 - Historical Summaries (Persian Gulf - Vol II) 1907-1953

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from the centre and for uniform scales of pay were first accepted by the Ruler and
then put into cold storage owing to the opposition they encountered from members
of the ruling family wno were heads oi departments. Crichton therefore was
unable to put the State’s financial organisation on a proper footing but by the end
of 1953 he had succeeded in extracting budgets from all except two departments and
in ensuring an equitable distribution of the State’s revenue between capital and
current expenditure and invested reserves.
17. As Crichton’s efforts to re-organise the State’s administration appeared
to be meeting with so little success, Sir Roger Makins when he visited Kuwait in
1952 recommended that consideration should be given to the appointment of a
senior and experienced British Adviser there.(”) This proposal was discussed, the
Foreign Office favouring the idea of appointing a senior adviser with the idea of
his becoming a “ Belgrave,”0 but in view of the unpopularity of the term
“ Adviser ” it was decided that the Ruler should be pressed to employ a senior
British Personal Assistant. In July the Political Resident was accordingly instructed
to ask the Ruler (1) to suppress Fahad, who had been giving much trouble to the
British experts, (2) to appoint a British Personal Assistant and (3) to delegate
authority for taking decisions to the Development Board and the Finance
Department.(2<) The Ruler asked that these requests should be put into writing,
which was done so far as the second and third requests were concerned, it being
thought better that a further oral approach should be made regarding the first one.
He replied to the written requests to the efTect that as things were now proceeding
satisfactorily he thought it desirable that the proposals should be kept in abeyance,
and averted the oral approach regarding Fahad by complaining about the behaviour
of Crichton and Hasted. In August 1953 the Political Resident delivered to the
Ruler a letter from the Prime Minister recommending the appointment of a British
Adviser but the Ruler politely but firmly refused to consider the appointment at
that time.
18. At the end of 1951 Major-General W. F. Hasted, C.B., C.I.E., C.B.E.,
D.S.O., accepted the appointment of Chief Engineer to the Kuwait Government.
He arrived early in the following year and a Development Board was set up in
which he and Crichton were the leading spirits. Hasted set to work with great
energy and a number of large construction projects were given to British contractors
working in partnership with British firms. He also employed a number of British
experts on his staff; by the middle of 1952 there were 24 British engineers in Kuwait
in Government employ. The Ruler in due course became alarmed at the rate of
expenditure and other members of the ruling family were jealous of the position
and patronage which Hasted had acquired. Furthermore all the biggest and most
profitable works were in the hands of five British contracting firms and their
Kuwaiti partners (paragraph 21 below). Hasted allowed himself to be identified
with these firms and became the main target of criticism directed against them, and
British enterprise in general, by Kuwaitis who had not obtained contracts or what
they regarded as their share of development expenditure. This criticism was still
vocal at the end of 1953. In May 1952 the Ruler virtually dissolved the Development
Board as it then existed by forbidding the directors of departments to attend it.(34)
In July he stated that the Development Board was purely technical and advisory and
that Fahad as head of the Public Works Department could revise any orders given
by Hasted.(“) In December Fahad was made President of the Board and a proposal
was made that future construction contracts should be handled on a co-operative
basis through a holding company which would replace Hasted's organisation, This
proposal came to nothing, but in the spring of 1953 a Syrian called Jabri was
appointed Chief Engineer and Hasted was informed that his duties were entirely
advisory and not executive.(aT) Hasted made many complaints but accepted the
position. At the same time it was decided that all future contracts must be put
out to tender, and that priority should be given to Kuwaiti firms, other than those
already working in association with British firms, or mixed companies. All this
led to much ill-feeling between Hasted and Crichton. The former blamed the latter
for the instructions that had been issued to him, and the latter the former for
refusing to submit to financial control. The British contracting firms voiced their
Para. 14 at p. 6 of Sir R. Makins’ Report.
(”) FO to P.R. EA 1055/5 G of April 10, 1952.
}u( Tel from FO. to P.R. 459 of July 14. 1952 (EA 1055/41 of 1952).
f” Tel from Kuwait to P.R. 105 of May 9. 1952 (EA 1015/11 of 1952).
’• Tel rom Kuwait to P.R. 165 of July 11. 1952 (EA 1055/40 of 1952).
n Kuwait to F O. 95/9/53 of April 9. 1953 (EA 1103/36 of 1953).