Page 230 - PERSIAN 9 1931_1940

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V.—Condition of the Country.
(Law and Order.)
I (a) This has been nil that could he desired and the chance tlmf i,o
over the .State ns compared with 1929 and the years previous, is little short™f

„ JfoVSitai A-"**” ”E"“I m
(c) As recorded a year ago the reasons for this satisfactory state of affairs
may be summarised shortly as below :— lUHB

first sign of trouble. * * 1 115
2. The opening up of the Arabian Coast as an Air route by Imperial Air

3. The frequent flights of R. A. F. machines over the Principality and down
the coast to Bahrain.
4. The stern and tight control maintained by Bin Saud over the Nejd
border tribes, and the sympathy generally which the latter feel for
Kuwait, as a result of the King's ‘ blockade ’, which has resulted
in a wide and tacit arrangement among the bedouin to do nothing
to hurt the people of Kuwait and their small tribal community.
5. The many car visits of the Shaikh to every corner of the State in the
process of “ hawking ” the Hubara or bustard. This goes on
throughout the cold season.
6. The frequent tours made by the Political Agent into the interior where
lie visits the camps of the bedouins and generally shows himself.
This breeds a spirit of confidence and a growing belief that Ilis
Majesty’s Representative keeps his eyes and ears open and would
not be moving about in the hinterland and among the Bedouin
unless by order of the Protecting Power,
7. The fact that(< Akhwanism ” or the fanatical "Wahabi spirit which wa3
a feature among the Bedouin prior to 1930, has now disappeared,
especially among the northern tribes of Nejd more particularly
among the Mutair, Ajman and Awazim. The latter tribes to-day,
more than ever, look to Kuwait with affection and regard and count
the time not far distant when they will once agapi be able freely
to visit Kuwait and buy supplies. This fact perhaps more than
any other, has had a stablizing effect in the desert and acts as a
wholesome deterrent to anyone minded to start a course of raiding’,
etc.
(d) There were no Bedouin incidents such as raids, etc., during the year,
and Bin Sagd’s frontier officers allowed none of their patrols to cross the
border.
(e) In the Town of Kuwait one case only of house breaking with violence
occurred in the 12 months under review, a remarkable record when one comes
to think of it. The culprits in the case, 3 ’Iraqis, were caught after a short chase
and summarily dealt with.
VI.—Relations with Saudi Arabia and Blockade.
(a) The personal relations between Kuwait and Bin Saud have been out­
wardly perfectly friendly and good throughout 1933. This m *
continued blockade and the apparently unchanged intention ot the v i a
bend Kuwait to his will, by continuing to prevent r
1. AH caravan communication with the inferior of Saudi Arabia.
2. As well as by the strict banning of Kuwait to all his own tribesmen,
(b) Outwardly Bin Sand’s declared policy has been and apparently sh is,
to endeavour to deflect the trade, that would normally pass throng xrnga
Qassim in Nejd, and to the great tribes of North-East Arabia, to m ji.pr0
ports of Qatif, .lubail and O.iair. Actually to those who know . 1 ’:f<n|iy
js little doubt, I think, that his real intentions to starve Kuwait cconora . y