Page 294 - PERSIAN 9 1931_1940

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tlio whole of his Northern tribes from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf wonll
have “ gone up ”,
C. Ah usual however ihc Bedouin tribes could not co-operate, and each
wanted to wait and see what would happen in the South before deciding on nny-

7. Bin Sand sizing up the situation exactly, and having his finger on the
pulse or his tribes as ever, acted in masterly fashion, when he saw that his rush
down the coast to Jiodeidn had not succeeded in bluffing Yahva into swing for
peace. Ho declared himself anxious to end the bloodshed between the
‘1 Musalmccn ” and offered generous peace terms to Yemen.
8. Bin Sand succeeded in impressing the world with his magnanimity, but
in no wise did he deceive his own people or tribes, who one and all recognized
that in doing as lie did, be had saved himself and the house of Sand from
disaster.
0. Once again had the luck (hath) of the King come to his rescue.
10. The Shaikh of Kuwait, who would have liked to have seen Bin Baud
suffer a mild defeat or ns he pu! it “ have some of the wind taken out of his
head ”, was not a little relieved that complete disaster had not overtaken tli-
King’s armies. For like everyone else in North Fast Arabia, he firmly believed
.that Bin Baud’s distant adventure was leading him straight to destruction.
11. In this connection it should never be forgotten, that although Kuwait
hates Bin Baud for his local anti-Kuwait “ Blockade measures she yet
admires and looks up to him, as the great champion of the Musalmecn in the
world today. In particular is he admired for the way he deals with the Euro­
pean powers, and keeps them all wooing him, yet never letting them got to near
or loo familiar, lie is a second “ Saladin ” for the Arabs today.

VII.—Relations ivith Iraq.
1. Officially these have been correct throughout the year, though unfortu­
nately the 31st of December 1924 saw the famous “ Date Gardens question ”
still unsettled. One still hopes however that 1935 will see the end of the sad
business which lias done so much to acerbate Kuwa’t feeling against her
northern neighbour and to strain her old loyal and affectionate feeling for the
British connection to near breaking point.
Full details and reports on the measures and counter measures taken by
both sides in the tight for these gardens will be found elsewhere.
2. 1934 saw also the second “ big push ” of the Iraq Government fin their
political campaign against Kuwait) develop and come to ft head. One refers
to their “ anti-smuggling ” attack.
Briefly, Iraq, following the lead of Persia, had raised her sea Customs tariff
to such a dizzy height that smuggling was bound to occur on nil her borders.
Kuwait with her low Customs tariff, fixed many years ago, to enable her
to compete with Bahrain, Bahai,'etc., in the common and natural desire to sup­
ply the Bedouin world of Arabia with their wants, naturally became a cheap
and sought-after marker for the Iraq nomad population. These latter financed
and assisted by the river tribes of the Euphrates had found it clearly to their
ml vantage during the existing hard times, to come down to Kuwait and do their
shopping.
3..Iraq took objection to this and reouested Kuwait to prevent her
tribesmen entering Kuwait territory, or failing this, to accept an official (j of
whoso pay would come from Iraq) to act as her Customs Director, whoso busi­
ness, among others, 'would be to fix a trbde quota of imports sufficient tor the
needs of the Kuwait population.
4. Kuwait’s reply is that, she has just as much right to try and develop her
small and meagre trade with (he outside world as her big neighbour has, and
that to accede to Iraq’s request even if it v'cro possible to do so, would be
tantamount to asking her to commit political suicide.
5 Clearly Iraq's honest and only course is to place a line of Customs posts
on her frontier, and by a system of tribal and police patrols to herself stop the