Page 70 - PERSIAN 9 1931_1940
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Southern border, and at the same time invited them to co-opcratc with him in
preventing any Nejdi tribesman from coming in or going out of Kuwait State. Hia
efforts had the desired effect and several parties of Mutair moving in twos and threes
were caught by Jadaan’s men running contraband, and were duly handed over to
ibn Muharig for punishment.
Unfortunately for ibn Muharib’s plans, Bin Saud’s tax gatherers suddenly
appeared on the scene and started taking Zikat from the Dhafir. This caused a
panic and the rank and file began to melt away and disappear back into Iraq.
Jadaan was thus left without any real following and so powerless. He himself
got into the bad books of Bin Saud for allowing this dispersal of his men, and was
called to Riath to make explanation.
On 29th October ibn Muharib himself crossed the frontier line with an armed
patrol, and for 5 days made an extensive and secret reconnaissance of all the routes
converging into Kuwait Town. In spite of his hiding by day among the sand
dunes which abound South-West of Kuwait, he was seen and recognized by several
persons. The nearest point that he reached was Chadadiyeh, 10 miles from the
Town. This fresh incident was at once reported to His Majesty’s Government by
the Political Agent and direct to Bin Saud by Bin Saud’s trade Agent in Kuwait,
who saw that the activities of ibn Muharib would rebound on his master’s head, and
he wished the latter to have an opportunity of denying responsibility before the
complaint came. This had the desired effect and Bin Saud, following his usual
methods withdrew ibn Muharib from the frontier and replaced him by Saad ibn
Khramis (a negro).
On 22nd December ibn Saud ordered ibn Kharamis to establish a blockade
post of 18 men at Rigai, the South-Westerly corner of Kuwait State, and where it
joins on to Iraq. This was the first occasion that such a post had been located
there, and it effectively prevented tribal caravans however small from slipping into
Kuwait from the South-West.
About this time also came the news that Bin Saud had agreed as a sop to
Jadaan al-Suwait to permit those Dhafir elements who had come over to Nejd and
thrown in their lot with him, to obtain their supplies from the towns of Iracj along
the Euphrates. Similarly fearing another mass movement, this time of his Nor
thern Shammar tribes, into Iraq, he granted the latter the same concession, at the
instance of ibn Musaad, his Governor of Hail. All other tribes of north-eastern
Arabia had still to get their food from Jubail and Hoffuf, and at the end of the year
under review this was still the order.
The above events have been given in more or less chronological detail to show
the varying steps taken to tighten up the blockade and prevent Nejd Tribesmen
from trading with Kuwait.
That Bin Saud’s policy was an unwise one, goes without sa ying, for in his
efforts to divert Kuwait’s trade to his own ports in the south, he nas successfully
estranged his own tribal people, and still more the town population of Qasim.
Actually of course Kuwait, though it would always welcome the regular move
ments of Bin Saud’s tribes up to its borders, is mainly anxious to recover the heavy
caravan traffic that used to ply between the port and the province of Qasira. This
primarily is the trade which will bring recovery to her, not the supplying of the
Bedouin with their petty needs of dates and rice.
Kuwait today is in desperate plight and something must be done, otherwise
she will be reduced to the size of Debai.
V.—General and Local.
(a) Customs, (i). It may be recalled that in June 1930, an incident which
was fully dealt with in this Agency Administration report for that year, occurred
which entailed the dismissal of Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif bin Abdul Jalil from
the post of Director of Customs.
At the instance of Khan Bahadur Mirza Mohamed, C.I.E., solicitor and agent
to His Excellency the eaj-Shaikh of Mohammerah, this official was arrested and
convicted by His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait, for forgery, and suffered dis
missal and disgrace.