Page 278 - Records of Bahrain (3) (i)_Neat

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but if any of theso measures can in the opinion of Government still be forced on
the Sheikh before the Chanter is considered closed, so much the better. I gather
however from the concluding scntcnco of paragraph 3, letter No. 1873-li. B.
above referred to, that this is probably not the ease.
5. Until I know how far the Government of India concur irt tlic views
expressed above it seems of little use my cntcringinto a detailed discussion
regarding tho sovcral mattors touched upon in the Political Agent's presont com­
munications. Moreover his letter No. 304 covers so much ground that l fool it.
difficult to handle it satisfactorily in a single communication1 and” therefore limit'
myself tp such comment, in a separate memorandum, as it seems dcsirablo to
forward simultaneously with this letter.
6, I may mention however before concluding, with reference to paragraph 37
of the Political Agent's letter No. 304, that if the passage which I have enclosed
in a red ink parenthesis be eliminated for the present, l see no objection to the
Political Agent being authorised to make a communication to tho Chief in the
sense of tne rest of the paragraph if the Government of India do not consider
that this has not already been made fully clear to him in the ultimatum presented
to him on 35th February 1905.

Memorandum of comment upon details of Political Agent's letter No. 304,
dated 24th June 1905.
Paragraphs 3 to to.—Captain Prideaux here sets down not his own views
but a statemont of what he believes would be Sheikh Esa's. if the latter could put
them into shape.
Paragraph //.—In his.remarks regarding the Bahrein Customs the Political
Agent writes "the state of affairs here differs very greatly from that at
Muscat" but he docs not explain how it differs, and I find it difficult to agree
with his conclusions in the last part of this paragraph, his allusion to the British
National Debt seeming inappropriate.
The eases of Bahrein and Muscat appear to me to be precisely the same.
In neither ease is th.crc any national administration or national account* In both
casos the Ruler administers the state as a private concern, for himself; ho
renders account to no one and, so far as my experience goes, kccps.no account.
There is nothing to prevent him if lie cnooscs, so long as he gives his regular
employes something on account occasionally, from spending his whole income
for the year in the purchase of a large pearl or a private steam yacht. In both
cases the Rulers have always been heavily in debt to some Banian usurer usually
the Customs farmer because he will lend easiest. We may call such a loan an
advance on tho Customs revenue, if we wish, and it is true that as long as th.a
" farmer" is not changed the debt may continue to be carried over with the
addition of'plentiful, interest from one year to another, but the moment another
Banian ‘intervenes, or is brought in by the Sheikh, his draft on the la$t
one becomes just as much a private debt as money- borrowed from any othqr
Shroff.
The Sultan,of Muscat up to. the time I left was still paying off,, and was
much hampered by, old debts qf this kind*
Except that the Sheikh of Bahrein is better off and spends a smaller por­
tion of his income on his Bedouin friends than docs Scyyid Fcisal, the two eases
scerp, precisely parallel.
Paragraph 75.—To ordain that all aggrieved persons should be considered
to havo a right of appeal to tho Political Agent against tho Sheikh would' in my
opinion bo incompatible with the Sheikh's independence and tho ordinance could
only, bo worked under a full British Protectorate, internal as. well as external. I
arp sure we'.should very soon and very frequently bo brought to an' impasso if wo
attempted to institute such a doctrine under the existing rdgime.