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British interests and influence, 1898-1904        23


               Copies of above wore sont t.o—(1) Her "Britannic Majesty’s Political Agont
           and Consul, Maskat; (2) Ilor Britannic Majesty’s Vice-Consul, Mohammerah;
           and (3) British Vice-Consul, Bushiro, for favour of their opinion.



                             No. 100, dated MasUnt, tlio 17tl» May 1893.
                 From—Major C. G. F. Fagan, Political Agent nl Maskat,
                 To—Tho Political Itosidont in tho Porsian Gulf.
               With reference to your confidontial endorsement No. 35, dated 10th April
           18')8,1 have tho honour to forward copy of a let!or from Surgcon-Licutcnant-
           Colonel Jayakar, on tho subject of tho advisability of recognizing tho oldest
           son  of tho Sheikh of Bahrein. Doctor Jayakar's long experience of tho Arabs
           and their ways has induced uic to avail myself of his valuablo aid, and to
           forward you his views on the subject.

                            No. G, dated Maskat, the 17th May 1898.
                 From—-SunoF.ON-LiEUTENANT-Coi.ONKL A. S. G. Jayakar, Civil Surgeon, Maskat,
                 To—Tho Political Agont at Maskat.
              With rcforeuco to your docket No. 183 of 10th May 1808, on the subject
          of the request.mado by tho Sheikh of Al-Bahroin for the recognition of his
          cldost son as his successor by tho Government of India. I havo tho honour to
          ohsorve, first, that the cldost son of a Shoikh of an Arab tribo is not necessarily
          regarded ns tho successor to tho Sheikhship of that tribe. There seems to ho
          no recognized rule to that effect, and, whilst tho usual custom is for the po^plo
          to recognize tho son or any other near relation of tho Shoikh who is regarded
          by himself and tho people generally during his life-timo as his probable succes­
          sor, instances aro not wanting to show that the largest purso and the longest
          arm aro tho most important factors in determining a contest for succession.
          It often happens that tho Shoikh during his lifo-timo puts forward his favourite
          sou or ono whom ho wishes to succeed him in the Sheikhship on all important
          occasions during his lifo-time, and tho people necessarily regard him as their
          future Shoikh. Such I learn from information gathered hero to bo tho actual
          case at Al-Bahrcin, whoro the would-be rival successors have not only acquiesced
          in the matter, but have given their expressed consent to tho succession of
          tho eldest sou.
              The recognition by tho Government of Indiaof any successor of tho Sheikh
          of Al-Bahrcin would necessarily mean binding the Government to install
          him in tho Sheikhship when tho occasion for it arises, oven by means of activo
          moasurcs if necessary, hut it appears to ino from tho previous history of Al-
          Bahrcin that tho moral influence of such a course would in itsolf havo tho
          boncficinl effect of dotorring any of the rivals or people generally from rising
          against tho acknowledged successor, so that a peaceful succession, which is much
          to bo dosired in tho interests of British trade, would follow. Should it, how­
          ever, happen that somo timo after tho succession of tho recognised heir to tho
          Sheikhship lie proves to bo a weak ruler or unablo to maintain his position,
          I am of opinion that it will bo open to Government either to givo him or with­
          hold from him their support, and tho present engagement would not thou
          bind them to any particular lino of policy. 1 am not in a position to form au
          opinion os to the probable effect that such recognition by tho Government of
          India would have on the feelings of the people of Al-Bahroin, but judgiug from
          what I learn hero that they havo given their consent, to tho succession of tho
          Sheikh’s eldest son, I should think that (hoy would ho glad to havo tho moral
          support of Government, and it will thus materially strengthen our influonco
          with thorn. As regards the Arabs of Oman who havo come to look upon AU
          Bahrein as being in tho position of a British protectorate, such a eourso would
          pot only noUurprisc them, but would, iu my opiuiou, bo looked upon by thorn
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