Page 50 - Gulf Precis (VII)_Neat

34

Enclosuro No. 2.
(Opening of the Karun.)
Tho advantages, commercially and financially, are so obvious and bo fully admitted, that
the objections or misgivings must arise from other considerations. Possibly theso are of a
political character, and the Persian Government may fed distrust of tho motivos of tho
British in urging this proposal. They perhaps suspoot England of ultorior designs against
those districts.
Persia ought, however, to bo perfectly freo from such distrust of the BritisA Government.
Persians can see for themselves thut England's position in tho East renders her interests, in
many respects, identical with those of Persia, and that, therefore, her policy ig naturally to
preserve and fostpr the power, int-giity and prosperity of a friendly Persia. To weaken and
assist in dismembering a friendly Persia would be totally opposed to British interests. For
England has all the territory, power, and wealth she can possibly desire in India. Her policy
is therefore directed to maintaining that position and ensuring leisuro to develop India and
improve its people. England has no inducement to covet the territory of any other Asiatic
power, and if forced to war in defence of her honor or interests and temporarily occupy
territory beyond her frontier, her Government has always lakon the earliest opportunity to
withdraw.
Persia is also a power which seeks no aggression, but desires pcaco nnd independence and
to preserve the integrity uf her territory.
When we come to other powers different motives aro at work, as is manifest by their
actions. '1 his has been so obvious of late years as regards Russia that England feels the
necessity for watching her advance and considering it as a possible danger to the peace of
Asia and India in the future To Fersia this steady advance eastwards is of still greater
moment, and Russia, formerly in contact on the noith-west only, now presses on her north­
east province. England and Persia have a common interest in ohecking the further advance
of Russia in that direction. If ever Russian power preponderated over British in that part
of Asia, it is obvious that Persia and Afghanistan would ceaeo to exist as independent
kingdoms. Therefore as England desires the maintenance of Persian integrity and power,
so Persia must feel the vital importance to herself of the proximity and friendliness of the
power which alone limits the growth of Russian Empire in Asia. The one power is, by policy
and inclination, peaceful and stationary, the other aggro.-sivo and advancing.
It is often felt to be strange that with such community of interests, Persia and England
have not drawn closer politically to one another, and that the former does not to a greater
extent shape her policy in accordance with the advice of her natural ally. There are no doubt­
ful causes for this, and the fault is not all on one side. Persia has to “ manage ” her powerful
and restless neighbour, and feels uncertain wbat support to reckon on in an hour of danger.
But it i* obviously Persia's interests to attract tbe friendship and support of England and
folly to distrust or wantonly alienate that power,
Persia should derive a sense of security and independence from feeling that she is not
wholly beyond reach of aid from a strong and friendly power in times of trouble in the north.
Would not an unfriendly refusal of the Persian Government to concede the navigation
of the Karun which is for the benefit of both countries tend to alienate ? Whilst if the
commercial advantage be attained, England bas no inducement to covet Persian territory ia
that quarter ? Will not relusal of the desired advantages to trade have a tendency to create,
through estrangement, a political danger which at present does not exist ?
No doubt Russians would suggest and instill misgivings such os alluded to for their
interest, which (totally opposed to those of Persia and England) is to keep those powers apart
and estranged, and to isolate Persia and prevent facilities for ready succour reaching her.
As regards the French endeavours to obtain a footing in Arabistan by a grant of land
and the ri-jht to place steamers on tbe Karun, it is scarcely credible that after the “ pour­
parlers” of years with the British Government, Persia would now entertain proposals of tho
French in tbe matter of river navigation. But apart from that it will not be difficult to
point out objections which should lead the Persian Government to be cautious of admitting
the French in that quarter. It is well known to all readers of previous and current history
that the French are possessed by certain restless ambitions in tbe East, that they aro not
satisfied with their present position, but still seek means of enlarging their power and
influence. In Syria, in Arabia, io Africa their political activity is known to the well-informed.
Recently new fields of enterprise have been sought, as in tbe present instance. Let attention
be given to tbe faot that the operations lately opened at Mohammerah are under direotion not
of mere merchants, but of officers of the French military and naval services. They wished
to at once fly the national flag at Mohammerah, where no Consulates have been established,
and the first consignments of goods consisted in great part of breecb-loading arms. Lot the
fact be considered that the Russians encourage and desire tho establishment of the French
in that part of Persia. This 6hows a political object, and it is one which is certainly not
directed to the advantage of Persia.