Page 110 - Arabian Gulf Intellegence

68 BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GOLF.

previous to any • application from the Arabian Chiefs to be permiu d
to declare war against each other at any future period bein- acceded
to, they should be required to furnish, a written and formal recognition
of the restrictive line,*—instructions which have since been carefulW
attended to. 1 ^
At this period, also, (May 1835,) a favourable opportunity offering for
the establishment of a peace between the hostile chieftains, by^the
presence at Bassadore of Shaikh Sultan bin Suggur, the Joasmee Chief
and Shaikh Shakboot, the father of the Beniyas Chief, and his plenipo­
tentiary in the adjustment of the claims arising out of the late piracies
of the tribe, a vessel of war was despatched to Debaye, with an invitation
to Obed bin Saeed, one of the Shaikhs of that place, to join the
conference. This chief promptly attended to the summons, and
was
immediately followed by Rashid bin Ilumeed, the Shaikh of Ejman,
and head of the A1 Naeem Tribe.
Every argument and endeavour to reconcile their jarring interests, or
adjust their conflicting claims for reparation and satisfaction on
account of past injuries, were entirely thrown away, especially as-they
deemed the guarantee of the British to any sort of arrangement a
sine qua non.
The proposition of a Maritime Truce for six months was, however,
favourably received, and the agreement having been drawn out, was
duly signed and sealed by the respective parties, upon whom it was at
the same time fully impressed, that any infraction would be treated
as a case of piracy, without any reference to inland disputes. To this
arrangement they expressed their perfect approval and consent.j-
* One slight exception may here be mentioned. While war threatened in 1838 to take place
between Bahrein and the A1 Ali Tribe (under its Chief Esai bin Tarif), Shaikh Abdoolla bin
Ahmed most unaccountably and unexpectedly objected to hostilities being confined within
any limits, under the impression (it was with justice supposed) that the British Government was
prepared to do anything rather than see hostilities break out between himself and Aboothabee
(where the seceded tribe resided), and in the hope, therefore, that hostilities would he forbid­
den, and his fugitive subjects compelled to return to tlicir allegiance. Although this chief
ought to have made his objections upon the establishment of the restrictive line three years
previously, yet, as he was an independent chief, who had generally observed the conditions of
the Treaty of 1820 more carefully than any other person in the Gulf, he was informed that it
would not be held binding upon him. On its objects being, however, at the time made
known to him, and its being further explained that he had everything to lose and nothing to
gain by its being suspended, he tacitly withdrew his dissent.
+ Of the great importance attached by the maritime Arabs to an uninterrupted pearl fishery
18 of the principal merchants of
an idea may be formed, from the circumstance that some
Shargah, in a private communication with the Agent at that place, offered to guarantee to ^
Indian Government the sum of twenty dollars per annum for each boat that wen ou ^
pearl banks, provided they were taken under its immediate protection, and a vesse not
especially deputed to guard them from aggression. Such a proposition o course c ^
be entertained, but it shows the desire of the mercantile part of the maritime r