Page 494 - Arabian Gulf Intellegence

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WAHABEES. !

as well as by the news of the reverse sustained by the Egyptians in
Syria, and the consequent reduction of Mahomed Ali Pacha’s authority
within its legitimate limits. ^
Syud bin Mootluk nevertheless continued to address letters to the
Chief of Oman, announcing his march into that province; but these
intimations (the excitement they at first caused having worn ofT, from
their having been so often made, and having as often proved without
foundation) produced little effect.
There was indeed little probability, under existing circumstances, of
Ameer Khalid actually making any attempt on the province of Oman:
it was however decided by the British Government, that in the event of
the expedition being undertaken, it should be met with as much active
resistance as his means afforded of arraying against it.
It now appeared that the Sublime Porte advanced their claims to
authority over Nujd ; and certain it is, that having received some presents
from Ameer Khalid, that Government appointed him Wulee of that
province.
His submission was of course hollow enough, having been in all
probability prompted by Korshid Pacha, to be disavowed whenever it
might meet the views of the Egyptians.
He addressed a very friendly letter to the British Native Agent
at Bahrein, expressing an earnest desire to renew the amicable and
cordial relations which formerly subsisted between his late father,
Saood, and the British Government; hinting that he had wished before
to open the correspondence, but had been prevented by Mahomed Ali
;
Pacha.
On his arrival at Lahsa, in October 1841, notwithstanding these
professions, he prepared a force, destined (as announced by the Native
Agent at Bahrein) for the invasion of Oman, and the siege of Brymee,
and to be commanded by the notorious Syud bin Mootluk. The British
Government having provided for this contingency in its instructions that
the Resident should endeavour to obtain accurate information of Ameer
Khalid’s movements, and, if he were preparing for the invasion of Oman,
should warn him of the opposition of the British Government, and re­
quire him to desist from the undertaking, and good grounds existing for
the belief that the expedition was now really in contemplation, it was
deemed expedient and advisable by him to despatch a British officer to
wait upon the Ameer in his camp at Lahsa (distant seventy miles from
the coast), with written and verbal communications, indicative of the
not
views of the British Government: to which he replied that he had
sent, nor entertained any intention of sending, Syud bin Mootluk into
Oman ; and supposing him to have been so disposed, it subseque y
that he really had not the power; and this was the m
turned out

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