Page 101 - Records of Bahrain (4) (ii)_Neat

Regional relations, 1927 403

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or force ourselves on the principality in the face of the world, against the wishes of
its rulers. The fact that under treaty the ruler is not allowed to correspond with
foreign powers lias not prevented him from so doing in the past, and would not do
so in the future.
58. In bygone days, in 1849, we did not take over Bahrain when it was offered
to us by Shaikh Mohammed because of the commitments it would give us in adminis­
tration and defence. To-day our position in the Islands is accepted by the Arabs,
and we have accepted the commitments in administration, and we should have
cquall/ to accept the commitments for defence if Bahrain were threatened. Indeed
I am separately suggesting it us a Naval base and the headquarters of our squadron
in the Persian Gulf.
59. The objections to a Protectorate arc purely political, they arc no longer
administrative. But Shaikh Hamad knows that he cannot stand without us, and
indeed I would say that notwithstanding his personal outlook, he is content to keep
us there for that reason. His state of mind is a mixed one to be swayed either way
by the course of events. At present, though turning towards Ibn Sand, in his per­
sonal feelings, lie looks towards us ami has no desire for the rigid strictness of Wahabi
rule.
GO. I would suggest then that Shaikh Hamad should be induced to approach us
saying that lie fears the political situation, and would be glad if we would extend
to him the protection which was refused to his predecessor in 1849.
With the consolidation of our position we could afford to cut down the British
staff to one man, and insist that Shaikh Hamad should make all the show of ruler-
ship, as in an Indian State, since our position would be unassailable except by
force.
Gl. The Protectorate thus concluded need not be proclaimed for the moment,
if it is not desired, but it would legalise and consolidate a position which is loose
and uncertain. I cannot, personally, face with equanimity a future based on the
present circumstances of world politics, especially of Eastern politics, and the con­
ditions under which we arc now tolerated in Bahrain, conditions which with the
advance of the Wahabi power, might, in place of a willing subordination, become a
forcible bond founded on no right with a hostile people in open sympathy with an
advancing Islamic power.
G2. We are losing our position in the Northern coast of the Gulf; we shall
equally lose it iu the Southern if we allow Bin Saud to consolidate his power on the
whole Southern littoral.
A copy of this despatch is being sent to Iiis Majesty’s Minister, Tehran.

MC'0311'D—20—17.0.27—airs.