Page 401 - UAE Truncal States_Neat

Chapter Nine

and institutionalised administration in most of the other Emirates
facilitated the introduction of the overall and comprehensive legislat­
ive and executive activities of the new central authorities. Gradually
the individual Emirates’ governments would need to conform in their
legislation and integrate their administration into this evolving
central system, if for no other reason than the fact that the
constitution does not specifically allow (although it does not forbid)
new legislation to be enacted by the Emirates’ authorities exclusive
of the Union authorities. Local laws and regulations are foreseen by
the constitution only within the frame of the implementation of
Union laws through the governments of the Emirates (Article 125).
The centralists intentions of the constitution are evident par­
ticularly in the provisions regarding the position of the President of
the Union. The powers assigned to him in Article 54 could be
interpreted as being in keeping with the representative nature of the
head of State, but the President does, in fact, also have the last word
in the selection of the entire cabinet, (Article 54, paragraph 6). This,
together with his power of “supervising the implementation of Union
laws, decrees and decisions through the Council of Ministers of the
Union and the competent Ministers”, (paragraph 8) augments the
centralists character of the executive authorities.
In practice the amount of central as opposed to regional admini­
stration depends very much on the distribution of funds between the
central government organs and the local bodies. The constitution of
the UAE addresses itself to the financial aspect in Part Eight, entitled
“Financial Affairs of the Union”. Yet the relevant articles (126-136)
do not give guidance; they deal in general terms with the source of the
money for the central government’s expenses and mention only that
the member Emirates “shall contribute a specified proportion of their
annual revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of
the Union” (Article 127). The manner and scale of these contribu­
tions were to be prescribed by the Budget Law. Thus the central
government has no recourse to the constitution if it is in danger of
becoming ineffective through lack of funds. The ability of the central
government to finance the exertion of its powers, to the extent which
the constitution anticipates, depends in the event on a further
compromise. However, a law stipulating the percentage of each
Emirates’ annual income as its budget contribution is less per­
manently binding than a clause of the constitution. In the event, the
generous budget contributions of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi provided

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