Page 111 - PERSIAN 5 1905_1911_Neat
P. 111
REVIEW BY THE POLITICAL RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. 0
maintained unchallenged at Umkasr and on Bubian Island. How long we can
ftfford to continue ignoring the latter without prejudice to Mubarak s in
terests and our own is a question which no doubt occupies the attention of his
Majesty's Government.
The all important topic of the Baghdad Railway is naturally never long
absent from the sphere of discussion and gossip, but no concrete evidences
of the advancement of the project, have been apparent at the Gulf end, and at all
events there have been no active signs of German interest or intrigue in Koweit.
On the other hand we know that the subject has been closely watched and
periodically discussed in those of the Chanceries of Europe which are at all inter
ested and I should mention that just at the close of the year the arrival of a
party of Turkish officials at Fao and some land measuring operations with which
they busied themselves, were locally attributed to the investigation of a project
for cutting a canal across the Fao angle from the Shatt-el-Arab to the Khor Ab
dullah, in order to avoid the “ bar.”
It is also worth recording in this connection that the R.I.M.S. Investigator
in December 1906 made an interesting examination of the Khor Zobeir, finding
3 fathoms of water to a point within 11 or 12 miles of Bussorah and Mahom-
merah.
The advice given to the Shaikh to introduce a special flag for Koweit or a
distinctive device on the Star and Crescent which be now flies, which would enable
the identity oi dhows hailing from his territories to be recognised. has not in
the end been followed. Mubarak always expressed his inability for fear of
reprisal from the Turkish authorities, to introduce an entirely new flag, or to adopt
any superscription on the present, one in the Roman character, but after discuss
ing various devices with the Resident he provisionally approved the superscrip
tion of the word l* Koweit ” in Arabic, written diagonally across an angle of the
flag. By the time however that a batch of properly made bunting specimens
had been prepared ior him to enable him to introduce the change, his apprehen
sions of Turkish displeasure again got the better of him and he would not ven
ture upon the introduction of the revised pattern without a written guarantee
to the effect that the British Government were prepared to afford his dhowB
immunity from possible ill-treatment by the Turkish authorities by reason of
its use. His Majesty’s Government on being referred to considered that the
slight advantage to be gained by the change of flag did not warrant such a
guarantee being given and decided not to pursue the matter.
During the 12 months under report the Xejd arena has been comparatively
free from strife on any large scale, mainly no doubt owing to the death during
the year of two successive representatives of the “Bin Rashid” family. The
fall of Abdul Aziz “ bin Rashid ” which took place in April 1906 and found brief
mention in last years review is recorded more fully by Major Knox in his present
report. His son and successor Muta’ ab, a youth scarcely out of his teens, was
not left long in the enjoyment of his precarious inheritance, meeting with his
death in cold blood at the hands of his cousin, Sultan bin Hamood. The latter
whose barbarous treachery is said to have so disgusted his own father Hamood
as to drive him into voluntary exile at Medina, had not up to the end of the year
begun to offer any serious opposition to the dominant influence of Bin Saood;
meanwhile the Wahabi Amir had boasted himself sufficiently secure in his tri
bal position to repeat with increased assurance, through his friends, Shaikh
Mubarak of Koweit, and Shaikh Jasim bin Than! of Katar, overtures for some form
of British recognition which he made direct to the Resident three years ago but to
which no reply was then considered expedient. The specific nature of his pre-
sent appeal seems of sufficient interest to be placed on record.
In effect he claimed that he had now completed the vanquishment of his
rivals and that p far as Arab foes or competitors were concerned he felt in an
unassailable position as ruler of Nejd: furthermore he even professed to be con
fident of fulfilling his ambitions in the direction of clearing the hated Turk out of
Central Arabia altogether and of occupying the coast line himself. On the
other hand he realised that it might be difficult for him to keep his enemies
permanently at a distance as long as they had the freedom of the sea and
were at liberty to pour troops and guns'into the countrv through porta of
the Arab littoral, such as Katif and Ojair. Supposing therefore that th»
1147 F. IX.