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6 ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
Considering that we are dealing with a country which still exists, even if
on sufferance, as a Sovereign State in
Korman.
treaty relations with the Great Euro
pean Powers, it is difficult to conceive more complete and abysmal chaos than
that depicted in Lieutenant-Colonel Haig’s report. There is evidently not
the slightest semblance of Persian authority surviving in Persian Baluchistan,
and it is difficult to imagine how the Central Government can ever hope to rc-
iraposc its authority. I leave Colonel Haig’s report to tell its own tale.
An effective blockade on the Mekran Coast has been maintained by His
Majesty’s Navy at an enormous expense
Persian Mokran Coast.
but with signal success throughout the
year. With the details of our operations in connection with the suppression
of the traffic, it is impossible to deal satisfactorily within the narrow compass
of this review, and, apart from the arms traffic, there is little to call for com
ment in the history of the Mckran Coast for the year.
The deportation of Mir Barkat, in March, bv the Darya Begi at the in
stance of the Military authorities, was thoroughly deserved; unfortunately
the obligations of international comity were considered to preclude our deal
ing with him ourselves, and the ineffective handling of his case by the Per
sian authorities was a factor which had to be taken into account. His re
latives, Mir Haji and Mir Mustapha Khan, between whom the Biyaban Dis
trict became divided on the exit of Mir Barkat, have proved by no means satis
factory persons to deal with, and it is quite impossible that wc can frequently
be intervening in Persian jurisdiction to render them immune from the re
prisals which they naturally apprehend from Mir Barkat, now that he has re
turned. It seems to be conceivable that, if the Persian Government continue
indefinitely unable to exercise any authority over the Baluch Mirs of the Mek
ran Coast, we shall be driven to devise some measure of our own for the better
protection of the telegraph line and the prevention of the smuggling of arms.
There appears to be no doubt that Sardar Seyyid Khan, at present the
paramount Chief of Persian Mekran, having become a prey to the excessive
consumption of opium, is losing both his influence and his physical power, and
it would seem prudent on our part therefore to take time by the forelock and
try to bring his probable successor, Islam KLan, effectively under our influence.
Things have moved a good deal in Arabistan in the direction of the con
solidation of our influence and the
Arabistan.
Shaikh’s position. It is recognised that
Great Britain’s most valuable interests in Persia lie in, or adjacent to, the
Shaikh of Mohammerah’s territory, and that the strength of his political posi
tion and his prosperity are bound up with ours in that region.
I haVe already referred briefly to the acute friction which existed between
the Shaikh and the Basrah authorities in the early spring, and I need not go
into the facts of the case, which are fully dealt with by Lieutenant Wilson.
In a matter like this, the Shaikh of Mohammerah is placed in a very difficult
position. As local ruler of a large tract, of country, contiguous to the Turko-
Persian Frontier and the banks of the Shatt-el-Arab, and receiving no practi
cal support whatever from an incompetent government at the Capital, he has
to rely for his safety, and that of the national frontier, on the friendly advice
and support of Great Britain, and his own resources. In his present quar
rel with the. Turkish authorities his own Government, if not actually un
friendly to him, at any rate gave him no help, owing partly, no doubt, to their
ignorance of local political and geographical conditions, and of the important
interests involved. He had, however, the hearty support both of the Moham-
merah Consulate and this Residency, and it was satisfactory to His Excellency
to learn, when both sides of the question had been considered by His Majesty’s
Government, that his attitude throughout the difficulty had met with their
approval.
Shaikh Khazal realises that, being so closely thrown with the Turks on
the Shatt-el-Arab, as he is. and being such a large land-owner both in Basrah
and on the Turkish bank of the river generally, it is absolutely necessary for