Page 200 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920_Neat

55 PERSIAN GULP ADMINISTRATION REPORT
powerless, in the absence of the Amir, •wlio was too far off and hi
weak to give effective help. nieolf ^
Attack on JRaxoar.—Though the Baluchis now rotired, rumours wc
tantly current throughout tho summer of further projected incuiBioJ0 COns'
in September, they appeared again in Khabis and a party, fortunately an<*»
a small one, made its way as far as Rawar. Tho ltawaris with the 0l%
Government garrison made some show of resistance and, being probably
superior in number, drove otf the enemy witli some loss. Had they failo7lUk^
pillaging of this important weaving centre would have ontailed oxtro * 1
hoavy loss to most of the European carpet firms. tUev
Jiruft I?ivasion.—The rumours of invasion still continuod through
October and November and, towards tho end of the latter month, a 8tr
force actually entered Narmashir demanding the blood of Agha Khan, ti"
Governor of Bam, Salar-i-A!ufakham, had hurried to lligan but f0uJ?
himself outnumbered. Fortunately for him, some say through his negotiatio^
ns,
the Baluch force broke up iuto two bodies one of which appears to have mov&l
off towards Kaskit and Khabis from which direction looting was subsequent!
reported. Tho other and main party advanced into Jiruft, where the?
plundered and murdered and took prisoners and again moved off gradually
through Rudbar and Narraashir. This party was about 400 strong. ^
Zargkam-i-Nizam turned out his forces, but twice suffered defeat and returned
again to his home from Rigan leaving the Baluchis to pursue their way jn
peace to Sarliad. He bitterly reproached the Salar-i-Mufakham for not havin»
co-operated with him. Thus stood tho Baluch question when the year came
to an end.
The Baluch Problem.—It remains to say a word on what was done, and
what it was possible to do. to mitigate the Baluch evil. In tho first instance,
in May, this quarter of the province attacked was depleted of all forces*
Only at Bam was there a small force, perhaps 50 to 100 Bakhtiari sowars
with the Amir Hismat. This man showed energy and pluck and probably
saved Bam by his display of activity and readiness to take the’ offensive, and
with the force at his command that was the most he could do. Beyond
this, the attack was so sudden that it was impossible to organise any defence.
All that could have been done was for the Atnir-i-Mufakkam to have hurried
up with his forces from Aqta. This again would only have been useful had
the Baluch raid dev**’ rfped into an occupation, and it would probably have
meant a compels cmg outbreak in the Afshar country and Sirjan
On the appointment to Bam of the Salar-i-Mufakliam, who would not
have had even the small Bakhtiari force that was at the disposal of his pre­
decessor, Mr. Lecoffre and His Majesty’s Consul submitted proposals for the
sanctioning of a monthly payment from the Treasury for the maintenance
of a force of 200 mounted men at Bam. With some trouble a reluctant
consent was wrung from the Treasurer-General, and the payment of 1,800
tomans a month, calculated to be sufficient for a force of about 200 men,
was sanctioned in August.
On the occasion of the second invasion, in November, His Majesty’s Consul
recommended the sanction of a grant for the levying of a force from the
nomad and hill tribes of Kerman to oppose the invaders, but the proposal
was rejected in Tehran. Such proposals are, of course, open to the objection
that they must always entail a considerable waste and embezzlement of pubbj
funds, but anything is preferable to meeting Baluch aggressions with folded
arms, and will prove cheaper in the long run. The Baluchis will give up these
larger schemes as soon as they see that they are met with some pretence oi
force and are attended with risk. A Sirdar Muhtasham in Tehran and *
Bakhtiaii force in Ispahan have no terrors for them, while a Kermani Governor
in Bam with a following of a hundred or two Bam peasants or loafers 18 ,a?
object to be treated with generous contempt'and none of the districts w11®
the Baluchis visit has sufficient manhood or arms to put up any effective res
tance. The easiest way of dealing with the matter would, of course, beoy
Persian military expedition, but to this there are many objections^
ftt all successful it would require a largo outlay by tho State. The P*0