Page 451 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920_Neat

FOR TIIE TEAR 1910. 27
bo friendly during the passage of the troops, and this service was satisfac-
rrily rendered by the Khurusani and Luri hcadmon. Meanwhile Captain
\Tncitaff with his 95 rifles liad readied Baft on 4ih September and, though
uch disappointed at finding that Fraser's party had gone on to Kerman,
! (jjd not hesitate to direct his march straight on Saidabad. On the way he
learned that Hussain Khan and the e.v-prisoners were on the move from the
Chabar"umaz Mountains to the Kuh-i-lChajui (“ Khavicli ” on the maps)
and would cross bis line of march. No genuine assistance, however, could
Jo obtained from the Afshar or local inhabitants either in tho way of infor­
mation or armed forces, ns their object appears to have been to acquire merit
by pretended services and misleading information which would at the same
time ensure Hussain Khan an unimpeded line of flight. They succeeded in
the. latter aim, and the fugitive party got through. Captain Wagstaff followed
bard on their heels on the 10th and was eventually seconded by Lieu'tentant
Fraser who left Saidabad at 1 A.M. on tho 11th with his 30 sowars and some
Sirjan levies, but his own Infantry could cot hope to overtake mounted men and
Lieutenant Fraser was too late. The pursuit was maintained as far as Zavaru
by Lieutenant Fraser and up to Aval Chabquli by Captain Wagstaff, places
which lie to the south-west and south-east respectively of the Kuh-i-lChajuL
On the 13th September the forces concentrated, and took up their quar­
ters, in Saidabad. Active reconnaissance work was kept up hut nothing of
importance occurred until the 27th September. Rumours W’crc heard that
Hussain Khan was collecting men in Far* territory and intended to make an
attack on the British Force in Sirjan, but on the evening of the 27th it was
reported that he was far off at Qala Ghaihi. The detail of what happened as
learned from different sources arc rather confused. The Adl-us-Sultan makes out
that he warned the British officers of the probability of Hussain Khan's attacking
that night and that it was arranged that he was to withdraw his men from cer­
tain burjs which were to be occupied by Indian troops, that it was their failure
to occupy these forts that enabled Hussain Khan with his men to slip into
the town at night. Captain Wagstaff, however, says that the Adi bad given
him definite information that Hussain Khan was far off, and he is certain
that the Adi knew of, and was privy to, Hussain Elian’s attempt. Tn any
ease, early next morning, Hussain Khan was in possession of certain burjs
and houses in the town from which he opened fire on the Indian troops.
Fighting went on all day ar.d it was estimated that the enemy, who consisted
largely of townspeople, numbered the best part of 300. They were all behind
walls/ while the Indians were more or less in tho open, and it was only owing
to the bad shooting of the Persians that our casualties amounted to only about
half a dozen Indians. It had beon taken for granted that the Indian troops
could not and would not fight and when evening came and it had been proved
that quite the reverse was the case Hussain Khan, realising that his coup had
failed, broke out of the town with a party of 20 or 30 sowars. He was heavily
fired on but without effect. Some, however, say that Hussian Khan himself
stayed iu the town over the night. Tho Austrian Lorenz was almost cer­
tainly present during the attack, and according to some Bruggmann was also
there. It is said that communication went on between Agha Murad Khan
the “ loyalBuchaqchi, the Adl-us-Sultan and Hussain Khan. No effective)
assistance was received from Agha Murad's men. nor from tho local levies who
bad been raided by Captain Merrill to tho number of 300 or 400. Few of the
latter were even seen during the day, but it does not appear that they actually
joined the enemy. This small action may bo regarded in the light of
a British victory. It convinced tho local inhabitants that Indians led by
British officers would fight as no rabble of their own much-vaunted tribal
warriors would, and that their own marksmanship was unequal to picking
°ff British officers even at short ranges : and it must have convinced the ex-
pnsoner8 and Hussain Khan that oven with the advantage of cover and an
assisting population the possession of Saidabad was net to be won even by
* coup dc main from a handful of Indian troops, with odo small obsolete M.
b. Mountain gun, oporating more or less in the open.
After the fight tho policy of ’active reconnaissances in force was continued
”y Captain 'Wagstaff, but tho enemy was careful to keep well out of danger's
b2