Page 535 - PERSIAN 8 1912_1920_Neat

POR TUB TEAR 1017. 17
ijcnt via-h-via tho Governor-General, namely, that the former, though
jl0 lias no force at his disposal, is supposed to act as a check upon the
latter. Kurdistnni was dependent on tho Governor-Gcnoral for the armed
jo^nrs necessary for enforcing tho payment of revenue in the districts, while
tho Governor-General refused to supply him with any unless he received first
the whole or a part of the pay duo to him. His Majesty’s Consul was asked
to obtain a loan of Tomans 10,000 from the Imperial Bank of Persia for this
purpose, hut refused. Finally it was arranged by way of compromise, that
jCurdistani should provide Tomans 2,000 on account, whereupon the Governor-
General would send out sowars accompanied by agents representing himself and
the Revenue Department. These agents would collect revenue on “ hawalahs, ”
or drafts issued by tho Revenue Department cm tho duos of the various
districts, amounting to Tomans 37,000. The Governor-General was of course
determined that most of tho proceeds of these hawalahs should go to satisfy
tua own demands and those of his satellites, which amounted to the dispro­
portionate sum of over Tomans 10,000 a month, while similarly the Sardar*o
mental reservation was that as little revenue as possible should be collected
from his own and the Farman Parma's lands. As tho Sardar’s authority
among the sowars themselves was considerable, he had ample opportunities of
securing this end. It was not surprising, therefore, that’ the scheme in ques­
tion was not particularly successful in relieving the financial straits of. the
Revenue Department.
Community of interest between the Cover nor-General and Sardar Nusrat
as against the Revenue Department, together with Kurdistani’s not over-diplo­
matic methods of negotiation, resulted in the latter’s complete estrangement
from the Governor-General who accordingly formed an offensive and defensive
alliance with the Sardar. During the next three months (April, May and June),
the war of intrigue continued with varying fortunes, into which it is not
nececsary to go in detail. All sorts of trouble was engineered by the Sardar
for the Revenue Department, culminating in a prolonged strike on the part
of the entire staff of clerks who decamped taking with them the keys of the
office strong boxes ; while the Prince did his share by bringing continual pres­
sure to bear on the Shah. So long as he was supported by the Tehran
Government, Kurdistani carried on as best he could, though all hope of re-estab­
lishing the solvency of the province was at an end. Towards the end of April,
however, Vossuq-ud-Dowlch’s Cabinet definitely deserted him, and for the
next two months the Governor-General and Sardar Nusrat had their way and
worked the Financial Department to their own satisfaction: In Juue tho new
Democratic Cabinet of Ala-us-Saltaneh showed signs of wishing Kunlist-ani to
remain in office, but the Prince defeated this by his usual method of sending
ia his resignation and with the Sardar’s help getting up an agitation in hia
own favour to prevent the resignation, being accepted. The agitation con­
sisted of basts at the Telegraph Office, “ popular ” telegrams to the Persian
Government, attempts to close the bazaar, &nd so on. As it appeared bo be of a
definitely Democratic character, His Majesty’s Consul brooght pressure to
bear upon the Prince to put a stop to it. This he did, but not before he had
been successful in preventing the acceptance of his own resignation and in-
finally ejectiug Kurdistani, who was replaced by Shaikh-ul-Mulk. towards the
end of June and.loft Kerman on the 18th' of the following month.-
■ The moral of the Kurdistani episode is that under the present system, if a
Financial Agent does not conciliate, one might almost say pander to, the local
powers that be, he has no chance of success. Kurdistani indeed, if he had
able to win over either party, might have attained his ends; but the
^ardar Nusrat was too old an enemy, while hi9 own brusqneness and uncom­
promising attitude hopelessly alienated the vain and touchy Prince. The result
Jas that although he had the moral support and active assistance of His
Majesty’s Consulate, Kurdistani was unable to withstand the combination
Against him.
Apart from the imbroglio with the local authorities, His Majesty’s Consul
^operated with Kurdistani ia various other matters. One of these was the
&n<* question of the rates at which revenue is payable
” lands. Nominally payable in land, these revenues have long