Page 12 - F-35 and Transformation

The F-35 and The Transformation of the Power Projection Forces

Distributed operations over an extended battlespace to deal with a range of military operations require
distributed C2; not hierarchical detailed micro management.

In effect, the focus is upon shaping the commander’s intent and allowing the combat forces to execute that
intent, and to shape evolving missions in the operations, with the higher level commanders working to gain an
overview on the operations, rather than micro-management of the operations.

Unfortunately, the relatively slow pace of COIN, and the use of remotes (UAVs or RPAs) in the past decade
have led to a growing practice of growing the level of command in order to try to exercise more detailed
control. This has led to the current situation in the air operations against ISIS where you have more members of
the CAOC than you have actual air strikes!

According to one of the architects of Desert Storm, Lt. General (David) Deptula, the CAOC for Desert Storm
was quite lean, and the goal was to get the taskings into the hands of the warfighters to execute, with a later
battle damage assessment process then informing decisions on the follow on target list.

It was not about micro managing the combat assets.

And this was with air power multi-mission assets, which went out to execute a command directive in a
particular area of the battlespace to deliver a particular type and quantity of ordinance in that area of the
battlespace.

With new air technologies, multi-tasking platforms will fly to the fight and execute the initial commander’s
intent but will shift to the mission as needs arise during the air combat operation. Fleeting targets are a key
reality, which requires an ability for the pilots to prosecute those targets in a timely manner, rather than a
deliberate C2 overview manner.

Put in other terms, the command structures will need to “lean out” and to work with warfighting assets where
the pilots and operational decision makers are at the point of engagement, not in a building housing a CAOC.

http://www.sldinfo.com/c2-modernization-an-essential-element-for-21st-century-force-structure-innovation/

This requires build in a new approach to C2 from the ground up as the new assets are introduced into the
force. For example, the introduction of the F-35 should bring with it a fundamental rethink away from hub-
and-spoke C2 to distributed C2 and modular force package operating forces.

C2 for fifth generation aircraft is about setting the broader combat tasks and unleashing them to the
engagement area, and once there they can evaluate the evolving situation during their engagement time and
decide how best to execute the shifting missions within the context of the overall commander’s intent.

Hierarchical command and control of the sort being generated by today’s CAOCs is asymmetrical with the
trend of technology associated with fifth generation warfare.

As Robert Evans, a former USAF pilot, and most recently with Northrop Grumman put the change:

Formations of F-35s can work and share together so that they can “audible” the play. They can work together,
sensing all that they can sense, fusing information, and overwhelming whatever defense is presented to them in a
way that the legacy command and control simply cannot keep up with, nor should keep up with.

That’s what F-35 brings.

Second Line of Defense

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