Page 11 - Leverage and Learn_Neat

Leverage Allied Investments and Combat Learning Experience in Modernizing the U.S. Military

to these allies AFTER the US has shaped a new strategy and a new capability; it is about reshaping in an
interactive transformation process.

The problem for the United States is that a legacy defense acquisition system and barriers to effective
transformation remain in being. We are still pursuing AWACS modernization when Wedgetail has
st
demonstrated a clear 21 century alternative; and the global fleet of Airbus 330MRTT tankers are reality;
with NO new tankers flying in the USAF and flying the second choice for the USAF is a limiting factor.
It is crucial for the United States to tap the new systems and develop new concepts of operation to capitalize
on the new force; yet the legacy acquisition and stove piped service dominated systems limits the potential for
the United States.

How has this happened?
During a visit to Australia earlier this year, I participated in a Williams Foundation seminar that was debating
in public (and without doing so it will be difficult to gain the broad support necessary for transformation) how
best to build an integrated joint force from the ground up. No one is deluded that this will be difficult; but if
you don’t set the objective when you are buying software upgradeable systems, which have an inherent
potential for interactive modernization, and force transformation you are not going to get there.

When you are left with things like a 2030 AWACS modernization focus, or a Super Hornet versus F-35
conversation, or keeping a A-10 tank killer designed 40 years ago, it is difficult to boldly lead a
transformation effort.
After the seminar, I had a chance to discuss the challenge with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown and to get
his thoughts on the challenge facing the United States. To be clear, the crucial working role between cutting
edge professional military and the Aussies is crucial to the Aussie transformation effort. That is not in question;
what is in question is the capability of the United States to make the leap forward with the service dominated
and legacy acquisition system and the constant constraints which Congress has placed upon the dramatic
change which the US military needs to make to defend the United States and to compete effectively with peer
competitors.

According to Brown, “the systems are all there in the United States. The shoots are there for fundamental
change. But the legacy approach is like a giant tree blocking out the sun for the shoots to grow.”

He pointed out that the notion that one would modernize AWACS is “simply amazing to me. With the fuel
savings alone from replacing the AWACS fleet with Wedgetails a new fleet could be paid for in a few
years. But that in the US system it is difficult to get a tradeoff from keeping the old legacy systems running
and simply shutting them down; putting the new systems into the force; and leveraging them rapidly.

The new systems require new sustainment approaches. “The F-35 provides a great opportunity for a very
different sustainment system but with the Congressional mandated depots the opportunities for an innovative
industrial-government partnership are severely constrained.”
As the Trump Administration looks to rebuild the force if the fundamental barriers are not addressed, “even
50-60 billion dollars more won’t correct the kinds of logistical shortfalls which the United States faces. I'm a
little frightened for the future if the US forces keep going down the path they're on at the moment. Just
wishing that additional money will be available to operate the legacy force structure isn’t going to solve the
problem. The current funding issues and congressional limitations placed on the Services will drive the US
towards and increasingly hollow force.

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