Page 5 - Leverage and Learn_Neat

Leverage Allied Investments and Combat Learning Experience in Modernizing the U.S. Military

One way to augment the force would be to do something, which would seem to be at odds with the Make
America Great notion. As one Danish analyst put it well: “I have no problem with the idea of making America
great again. For me, the question is how?”

One way to do so would be leverage extant allied programs and capabilities which if adopted by the US
forces would save money but even more importantly ramp up the operational capability of the US forces and
their ability to work with allies in the shortest time possible. By so doing, the US could target investments
where possible in break through programs which allies are NOT investing in.

It is time to take a global view as the coming of the F-35 and the P-8 have made it very clear that global
technology is a key element for shaping 21 century high intensity combat forces, even when leaders seem to
st
be at odds.
There are many examples of this low hanging fruit, which can be exploited. And the old bromide that this
would cost US jobs is simply not true – foreign producers like American ones build in the country where they
export rather than simply exporting the end product.

First, there is question of rapidly inserting unmanned assets. While the US Navy researchers how to provide
for new capabilities, allies are already deploying a key underwater unmanned asset to work the demining
issue. It would make sense simply to operate and learn from this capability rather than simply experimenting
with prototypes.

The SAMDIS solution is in use by several allies.
As Norman Polmar and Robbin Laird have argued:

Undersea warfare is becoming more complex as an increasing number of nations are operating submarines,
advanced submarines and seafloor mines are being proliferated, and there are an increasing number of seafloor
military and commercial activities world wide.

Thus, there are increasing demands for navies to have enhanced capabilities to carry out surveillance to support
anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, general surveillance, and “special missions” in the depths.

Further, because of the need for rapid-reaction to crises and the varied ocean operating environments, these
surveillance capabilities must be deployable by surface ships and small craft, submarines, and aircraft, especially
helicopters.
This situation must be met by advanced, flexible, and highly capable sensor platforms.

Lethal Threats

Mines are major threats to warships as well as commercial shipping. According to mine warfare analyst Dr. Scott
Truver. “Enemy mines caused massive numbers of U.S. ship losses in the last century, during both wars and crises,”
he explained.
“During the late 1980s and early 1990s a U.S. guided missile cruiser, a large helicopter assault ship, and a
frigate were heavily damaged by mines in the Persian Gulf,” Truver recalled. “And many more vessels were mine
victims during the ‘tanker war’ in the Persian Gulf in that period.”

While potential enemies also have anti-ship missiles and torpedoes to threaten ships, “mines can be quickly and
surreptitiously laid by surface ships—including simple junks, fishing boats, and other coastal craft—submarines
and aircraft.”

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