Page 44 - Cooke's Peak - Pasaron Por Aqui

was thought that if war did come, there would be
internal division within the United States leading to
a southern slave rebellion and New England’s seces-
5 sion.
Furthermore, as a result of foreign-observer flat- tery, Paredes thought that his European-trained (and therefore “better”) 32,000-man army would make quick work of the 7,500-man standing army maintained by the Americans. Evidently his politi- cal judgment was little better than his military judg- ment for, in addition to overrating his gaggle of rabble and ineffective officers, Paredes assumed that a victorious war with the “northern aggressor” would prove popular and cement his control over Mexico.6 Unfortunately for Mexico, Paredes and
his government were wrong on every count.
Polk’s plan for conducting the war with Mexico was relatively simple, at least on paper. A naval block- ade of eastern Mexican ports would be continued, American land and naval forces would seize Califor- nia (and New Mexico in the process), and General Zachary Taylor would cross through Texas, invade the northern provinces of Mexico, and conquer Mexico City. This accomplished, Mexico would be forced to come to favorable terms quickly. To sup- port the anticipated action, Polk sent secret instruc- tions to the United States Pacific Naval Squadron and to the American Consul in California, Thomas A. Larkin. He also sent orders to General Taylor
8
to move his troops into the disputed Texas territory. The original border of Texas had been the Nueces River; however, the leaders of the newly created state claimed all the land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. It was into this disputed strip that Polk sent Taylor and his soldiers on March 28, 1846. The Mexicans were outraged by the deliberate provocation, and on April 12, General Pedro de Ampudia informed Taylor that the Americans were invading foreign soil and requested complete withdrawl within 24 hours. When Taylor refused to respond favorably, Mexican cavalry units were or- dered across the river and on April 25 fought a skirmish with a small American contingent that
9
resulted in the loss of several American lives. Taylor assumed the offensive, and by the time Polk learned of the encounter, “Old Rough and Ready” had already scored decisive victories against supe- rior odds. Despite the lack of a formal declaration, war with Mexico did in fact exist. Following a cabinet meeting on May 9 in which the Mexican
rebuffs of Slidell’s overtures were discussed without any firm decisions, the news of the first hostile en-
TheArmyofthe West
30
19
Two days later Polk asked
counter reached Polk.
Congress to declare formally what already
and on May 13 both houses approved a bill authoriz- ing Polk to accept 50,000 volunteers and appropriat-
1
ing $10 million for “national defense.”
In slightly more than a month, one of the factors
that had probably influenced Mexico in her hard line attitude was quietly put to rest. The United States gave up its “54-40 or fight” attitude in the northwest and peacefully compromised on an exten- sion of the 49th parallel, which already existed east of the Rockies, as a border between American ter- ritory and British Canada. On June 15, 1846, another 285,000 square miles had been added to the nation without expending money, munitions, or
men. 12
Secretary of War William Learned Marcy gave
instructions to his various leaders to escalate the war with Mexico vigorously. To Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny (Figure 13) he assigned the tasks of seizing Santa Fe, establishing a civil government there, and moving on to help secure California as quickly as possible. Kearny was a logical choice as he had served several years protecting commerce along the Santa Fe Trail between Missouri and the Mexican capital of New Mexico.
Marcy further suggested that Kearny make use of
civilian volunteers and that Council Bluffs, Iowa
Territory, where the Mormon emigrants were
camped, might be a likely place to pick up a large
group. However, he cautioned Kearny not to enlist
Mormons beyond a strength totaling one-third of his
13
command.
many-fold preparations for a major invasion opera- tion, so he delegated the responsibility of organizing
14
the Mormons to Captain James Allen.
Marcy was also greatly concerned about the prob-
able lack of roads in the far western theater of operations. One of the issues that was ever present in United States political and military thinking was the unrelenting problem of inadequate roads and other transportation media. From the time of Braddock’s ill-fated expedition of 1755, inadequate facilities had dramatically illustrated the necessity for moving troops and military supplies rapidly from one place to another. Following the War of 1812, Congress had asserted that lack of good roads had led to the initial disasters and inflated the cost of the
Kearny was occupied making the
existed,