Page 6 - MEOG Week 03

MEOG Commentary MEOG
one thing, while the Europeans underscored in their announcement that they had “worked tire- lessly to support legitimate trade with Iran”, those efforts have not translated into practical divi- dends for Iran. Nearly a year after they instigated the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) mechanism that sidesteps US sanc- tions, which was designed to facilitate trade with Iran without exposure to US sanctions, the ini- tial transactions are yet to be finalised. Seen from Tehran, Europe is still asking Iran to deliver fully on its JCPOA commitments while providing lit- tle in return.
Furthermore, the decision could tip the debate in Tehran away from what Europe is hoping for: internally, hardliners have argued at each stage of Iran’s carefully staggered breaches for more provocative steps to jolt the deal’s remaining signatories into taking meaningful steps towards upholding their end of the bar- gain. The Iranians have also indicated that the return of UN sanctions would lead them not just to abandon the JCPOA but to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) – a step that would likely not only push Iran further into the diplomatic cold but also place an obstacle in the way of future talks.
Still, with the dispute resolution process now underway, Europe should work three tracks in parallel. With the Iranians, the Europeans should underscore a key point in their joint statement: that their resort to the mechanism is a means for intensified diplomacy. If Iran refrains from
further breaches to the agreement, the process, which theoretically could lead to UN sanctions within 65 days, can be extended. Among them- selves, France, Germany and the UK can step up efforts to put INSTEX into effect, and put in place additional means of boosting trade with Iran, which probably requires a certain degree of US acquiescence and European willingness to stand up to pressure from Washington.
While Washington will likely seize on the dispute resolution decision to exert pressure on the Europeans into further isolating Tehran, the latter can instead make the point to the Amer- icans that nearly two years of coercive policies have neither curbed Iran’s regional influence nor yielded an improved nuclear deal.
There is a risk that, by triggering the reso- lution mechanism the E3 countries could be embarking on a path that accelerates the crisis they are seeking to prevent.
Their priority should remain an extension of the timeframe provided by the mechanism to seek to convince Iran to resume compliance with the JCPOA in exchange for meaningful economic reprieve. Ultimately, none of the agreement’s signatories are fully satisfied with the existing agreement. But building on it, rather than watching it collapse, should be the way forward.
A response from Iran to the European deci- sion is awaited with a mixture of trepidation and hope; in the present prevailing political climate it is very difficult to predict what this may be.™
P6
w w w. N E W S B A S E . c o m Week 03 22•January•2020