Page 7 - TURKRptJul19
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system’ with no prime minister and a diminished parliament, meanwhile, may be threatened.
The division of Erdogan’s party is on the horizon, even if new parties born of the disunity will only help erode Erdogan’s support and clear the way for another Imamoglu wave. The usual suspect for calling snap polls in Turkey is Bahceli. He has initiated all early elections in the country since 2001. All Turks, including members of the MHP, always keep an eye on what Bahceli is up to. No one can understand how Bahceli took over full control of the MHP and, in essential ways, full control of Turkey since the end of the 1990s. ‘Bahcelogs’ currently think that the MHP leader will bide his time for a while and then he will let ruling coalition partner Erdogan sink further into his economic and foreign policy woes. Erdogan, of course, has the right to call a snap poll himself. However, ‘Erdoganologs’, think that he might test the waters for getting rid of Bahceli while, at the same time, concluding his deal with the Kurds, whom in jejune fashion he mishandled prior to the Istanbul revote as he sought to shift a substantial Kurdish vote Yildirim’s way. Getting rid of Bahceli and striking a deal with the Kurds would help Erdogan improve his image in the eyes of the old, but now somewhat detached, allies in the West. However, Erdogan’s invisible partners in the Turkish state are also exerting influence that is hard to deflect, and they seem determined to keep Erdogan closer to the Russian orbit, even since Erdogan’s manoeuvres that cynics described as something like adding jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to his coalition (Bahceli’s discomfort at this ‘needs must’ strategy ahead of the revote was a sight to behold). Erdogan’s alternative option, according to the Erdoganologs, may be to call a snap poll very quickly to get ahead of the AKP’s perilous divisions. Even if all the main opposition forces again come together tactically, as they did for the March 31 local elections, they do not have the required two- thirds majority in parliament to themselves call early elections. However, although the opposition currently has the moral advantage and the popular support to push Erdogan to pencil in an early date with the ballot box, initial leaks from CHP officials suggest they aim to wait and let Erdogan sink deeper into the crisis which is all of his making. Yes, this is the CHP. Even if its new generation has won the major municipalities thanks to Erdogan’s consecutive mistakes, this CHP is the same CHP which is so far removed from ordinary people. The party simply waits on Erdogan to hand over the government to it.
All in all, it looks like snap polls will not be called within something like a few days, with all the parties waiting for the recipe to stew. In the horse racing analogy, Bahceli is always the favourite horse for sparking snap elections, but he dashes into the lead at a time when no one expects it. The odds on Erdogan deciding to go to the people are that much longer.
Geopolitical cliffhanger. On the foreign politics front, Erdogan is contending with a July 31 deadline set by Washington. An ultimatum sent in a letter by the US defence department calls on Turkey to scrap its order for Russian S-400 missile defence units by that date. If Turkey fails to do so, it seems in all probability to be denied F-35 stealth fighter jets, the security of which would be jeopardised by S-400 systems, according to Nato. Sanctions could also be triggered if the missile defence purchase is confirmed. Is Erdogan prepared to pay that price? One supposes that when he meets Trump in Osaka at the G20, he hopes that as two wheeler-dealers, with little regard for established conventions, they can wangle an arrangement. Erdogan media claim Trump has the right to delay the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions for 180 days and that when Trump has no more wiggle rooom, the Turkish president will ask him to levy the least damaging five of the 12 CAATSA sanctions listed by the US Congress.
Economic crunch-time. Turkey’s economy is fundamentally loused up in so many ways, but Erdogan & Co have so far not brought forward anything like a fundamental fix. Instead, they have been pouring in Treasury-backed credit to achieve a few short-term economic spurts to persuade voters to stick with them, first in the local elections, then in the Istanbul revote. As you may have read, it hasn’t worked. And Turkey’s economy is still pretty much screwed,
7 TURKEY Country Report July 2019 www.intellinews.com


































































































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