Page 49 - bne magazine March 2017 issue

bne March 2017 Southeast Europe I 49
Vucic opts for well-trodden path from premier to president
bne IntelliNews
February saw another prime minister of a Southeast Euro- pean country decide that the presidency was a more fitting role, when the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) decided to nominate PM Aleksandar Vucic as its candidate for the presidential elections expected to take place in early April.
The decision came more than a year after bne IntelliNews predicted the perennially campaigning Vucic would opt
to remove himself from the day-to-day firing line of the prime ministership and place himself above the fray (and the blame) for what will be increasingly difficult choices his government needs to make over the economy.
Since the Progressives have dominated Serbia’s political scene for several years, Vucic is virtually certain to win the upcom- ing election and the only battle he had was to get the party to junk incumbent President Tomislav Nikolic in favour of him.
However, there are rumours of a rift within the Progres- sives, with different factions backing Vucic and Nikolic. The party statement also touched on the issue, saying that “Vucic is promising in best faith to keep talks open with current President Tomislav Nikolic”.
Singling out the need for talks with Nikolic could indicate it is still not definite that the current president will accept the decision and back Vucic, raising questions about party unity. Nikolic previously said he would not stand
for re-election against Vucic. However, local media have been speculating about a rift between “Toma’s side” and “Vucic’s side” of the Progressive Party. “Toma’s side” is conservative, pro-Russian and less enthusiastic about EU integration and close ties with Western countries; “Vucic’s side” is pro-Western and dedicated to EU membership and better relations with the US, Germany and Nato. Thus, there is not only a gap between their leadership prefer- ences but also deep ideological differences.
Nikolic became the first head of the Progressive Party after he founded it in 2008, with Vucic as his deputy. The two politicians were previously members of the ultra- nationalist Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav Seselj. Nikolic resigned as head of the Progressives in 2012 when he became president of Serbia, pledging to be president for all Serbians, and Vucic succeeded him as party leader. bne IntelliNews speculated back in January 2016 that Vucic had his eyes on the presidency, noting the way the PM
had undermined Nikolic and sidelined his people in the party.
At first glance, Vucic seems to be moving from his current position to one with less executive power, since the posi- tion of president is mostly ceremonial. However, previous experience shows the country’s real leader is usually the leader of the biggest party in the parliament. For example, during his presidency between 2008 and 2012, Boris Tadic overshadowed PM Mirko Cvetkovic, since Tadic was leader of the ruling Democratic Party.
Thus, no big policy change is expected in the country if Vucic wins the elections, which is virtually certain given the lack of unity among the opposition. Indeed, the two most promising opposition candidates – former ombuds- man Sasa Jankovic and former foreign minister Vuk Jeremic – are set to be competing for the same pool of voters. By contrast, the Progressive Party remains popular after winning snap parliamentary elections in 2016, and its coalition partner the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has pledged to support its candidate.
And snap elections could be on the cards again. Vucic
also said he would soon announce his final decision on whether Serbia should hold early parliamentary elec- tions at the same time as the presidential election. Given the campaign-hungry PM has called two elections since his party took power in the 2012 parliamentary vote, the odds are the Serbians will find themselves back in the vot- ing booths in 2017 for the fourth time in five years.
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with the votes that gave it the parliamentary majority to secure a ref- erendum on the constitution. “Political observers are still trying to figure out what may have pushed the MHP from one extreme to the other; there is not yet a clear explanation,” wrote Bekdil.
Opinion polls are notoriously unreli- able in Turkey, but Bekdil offered the following analysis. A clear majority of
AKP loyalists will vote "yes" in addition to around half of the nationalists. That would make a combined 46% of the vote. Some Islamist parties and non-AKP voters favouring a presidential system can also be expected to vote “yes”, lifting the pro-Erdogan vote to 50-55%. “There is a sizeable group of ‘undecideds’ whose preferences may be influenced by Erdo- gan’s huge propaganda machinery or
by the argument that a strong president would strengthen Turkey as it confronts
a broad array of internal and external security threats,” Bekdil added.
A fake shake
Of course, any deviousness that Erdogan’s critics can accuse him of is more than matched by accusations of foul play being thrown at the “anti” campaign from the president’s camp. One seemingly bizarre intervention occurred on February 7 when the mayor of Ankara suggested Fethullah
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