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see Kushner when he visited Washington last year, but he shared photos of Trump’s son-in-law in Ankara when Kushner visited the Turkish capital in February.
There seems no rational way that Erdogan, who has attempted to portray himself as the decisive leader of the Muslim world, could back the “Deal of the Century” given Trump’s hugely disproportionate support for Israel versus the Palestinians and his brash moves to recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights and switch the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.
Erdogan regularly swaps insults with Israel PM and big Trump ally Benjamin Netanyahu, but perhaps he could ease up a little and not dismiss Kushner’s Middle East efforts out of hand should Trump do him an S-400s favour?
It’s all pure speculation of course, but Turkey watchers can find more solid ground as regards “well-informed” but unnamed sources who reportedly told Al-Monitor on April 15 that the US was pressing its Kurdish allies in Syria to ease their resistance to allowing Turkish forces to deploy on their side of the Turkish-Syrian border. That could be a sign that the US is moving to realise Trump’s pledge to Erdogan on placing Turkish forces in the planned safe zone in the northern Syria.
Reiterating the Turkish government’s view that Ankara does not believe Washington could countenance ‘losing Turkey’, presidential spokesman Kalin said during an event in Washington that he doesn’t believe the US would go down that path.
“Getting too close to US foes”. But let’s quote Tim Ash of Bluebay Asset Management’s emailed note to investors at length as it gives a gateway into where the fraught Ankara-Washington relationship is at. Ash wrote: “Turkey is getting too close to US foes—Iran, Russia and Venezuela. Erdogan’s personal friendship with President Maduro of Venezuela is inexplicable to the US body politic, and this is especially notable for people in DC, given that ensuring a democratic transition in Venezuela is currently a top priority for the Trump administration. On Iran—the Zarrab/Atilla cases [relating to Iran sanctions busting the US says was linked to Turkish public lender Halkbank] were particularly damaging in terms of the US-Turkey relationship, with some in the US identifying this as an example of Turkey’s willingness to flaunt the US sanctions regime around Iran. Possible sanctions for the Zarrab/Atilla case are still awaited, and indeed expected, the only question being their extent/scope.
“Generally the US sees its interests in Syria, not always aligning with those of Turkey—tensions over US support for ethnic-Kurdish groups.
“Probably a lot of the current tensions really relate to what Ankara sees as the generally ‘unsupportive’ (I am being diplomatic here) US response to the failed coup in July 2016—as compared to the response from Russia, Venezuela (and actually the UK). Suspicions run deep (at the highest level in my view) in Turkey as to whether the US was somehow behind the coup attempt (or knew about it beforehand and failed to give the Erdogan administration the ‘heads up’), and the presence of the leader of the Gulenist movement, Fetullah Gulen, in self-imposed exile in the US just does not help.
“US wants to pivot... to a new arc”. “There is a view in Turkey that the US wants to pivot away from Turkey as its key NATO ally on its Southern flank, to a new arc of Greece, ROC, Egypt and Israel, against the threat from Russia and Iran. These view are propagated by Eurasianists in Turkey itself.
“I am sure that I will have missed a few sore spots from either side, herein, but across the board the tensions/suspicions now run really deep. The most immediate issue seems to be S400s and the future of the F35 [fighter plane] project [which the US is threatening to kick Turkey out of if it acquires S400s],
25 TURKEY Country Report May 2019 www.intellinews.com