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Security and Defense Council. Also, the second draft introduces a definition of a representative of an oligarch. A person recognized as an oligarch: 1) must not finance political parties, 2) cannot participate in large privatizations, and 3) should file annual electronic declarations as public officials do. Also, a wide list of top officials will be obliged to declare any contact with an oligarch no later than the next day (except broadcasted events, meetings in courts and official meetings with a pre-determined agenda and participation list). The law also foresees the failure to declare a contact with an oligarch (or his/her representative) as a reason for the firing of: the human rights ombudsman, head and deputies of the State Security Service, the Antimonopoly Committee, the National Bank, the Central Election Commission, the State Property Fund, the National Anticorruption Bureau, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the High Council of Justice and the State Investigation Bureau.
EU Auditors issue report on anti-corruption aid to Ukraine The EU Court of Auditors (ECA) issued a report on EU measures to counter grand corruption in Ukraine on September 24. In the report, the ECA asserted that EU assistance and focus on the rule of law in Ukraine failed to specify grand corruption in Ukraine, though it is precisely this form of corruption that is holding the country back the most. The ECA defined grand corruption as, “the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few, and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society. Oligarchs and vested interests are the root cause of this corruption. Grand corruption and state capture hinder competition and growth, and harm the democratic process.” The auditors focused on the period of 2016-2019. The ECA pointed to successes in fighting corruption overall in terms of fostering investigative journalism, among other things. However, no EU-funded projects focused on grand corruption and state capture in particular. The report pointed out that EU efforts to help Ukraine in matters such as aligning Ukrainian legislation with that of the EU did succeed to a large extent. For example, the auditors point out that the Council of Europe reported that it had achieved “90% of the legislative and institutional objectives of the Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Action Plan”. However, these results were undermined by watered down legislation and bylaws and frequent amendments. Moreover, implementation was not an indicator for success in these programs. The EU, in a rebuttal, claimed that an examination of corruption is generally not broken down into subcategories, and that, though general, its projects did indeed place a focus on what it called “high-level” corruption. There are improvements, and the number of indictments of high officials has risen in the period under question. And the EU accepts the auditors’ recommendations without accepting the idea of a linear breakdown of corruption and easily digestible KPIs.
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released its 32nd report on human rights in Ukraine on September 23. The report covered the situation in the areas recognized as Ukraine by the UN, including those outside of the control of the Ukrainian government. The time frame under consideration was February 1 - July 31 2021. The OHCHR report noted increases in human rights violations in occupied Donbas and Crimea including forced recruitment into armed groups, ceasefire violations and resulting casualties, the enactment of a law in Donetsk that allows for the expropriation of immovable property abandoned by civilians, and forced citizenship changes. OHCHR noted, among other things, judicial and legal issues on the part of the Ukrainian government. In particular, “the suspension, dismissal and criminal prosecution of two judges of the Constitutional Court, jeopardising the independence of the judiciary and rule of law in the country”
8 UKRAINE Country Report October 2021 www.intellinews.com