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EurOil                                       COMMENTARY                                               EurOil

























                           Second, there is no indication that Russia  sanctions regime might also be difficult.
                         has been using these workarounds purely   What is more, Russia already has plenty of
                         as a means of moving petroleum into the  practice with respect to finding ways to work
                         European market. In several cases, Suezmax  around the limitations imposed by embargoes.
                         and Aframax-size tankers that departed the  For example, state-owned Rosneft spent enough
                         Baltic Sea or the Black Sea with Russian oil  time helping Venezuela’s national oil company
                         “for orders” in April have ended up transfer-  (NOC) PdVSA to find creative new ways to
                         ring their cargoes to very large crude carriers  export crude to China and other markets in
                         (VLCCs) that then sailed from the Mediterra-  Asia despite that under US sanctions Washing-
                         nean to South Africa.                ton actually blacklisted two of its subsidiaries,
                           Meanwhile, there is information to suggest  Rosneft Trading SA and TNK Trading Interna-
                         that Russia is sending more oil to Asia from its  tional, in February 2020.
                         Baltic and Black Sea ports than it did prior to   Rosneft has also used some of the same tricks
                         the outbreak of war (and in some cases, using  noted lately in the Mediterranean – according
                         smaller tankers than market conditions usu-  to a Bloomberg report from November 2019,
                         ally warrant for such long-haul voyages). For  which noted that a tanker chartered by the Rus-
                         example, the Suez Canal Authority (SCA)  sian company had switched off its transponder
                         released data earlier this week showing that the  upon entering Venezuelan territorial waters in
                         overall number of ships passing through the  order to obscure its activities. (Russia also seems
                         canal had risen year on year in May – and this  to be very familiar with the practice of blending
                         makes sense, given that in April 2021, the canal  and relabelling crude exports in order to obfus-
                         operator was still coping with the backups and  cate their origin, as Venezuela has been doing in
                         blockages caused by the MV Ever Given inci-  Asia for several years.)
                         dent. But the increase in traffic didn’t affect all
                         marine operators equally. SCA data show that  Sanctions: not 100% effective
                         while overall traffic went up by 6.3% year on  It seems likely, then, that Russia will use these
                         year in April, tanker traffic alone went up by the  tried-and-tested techniques (when it can get
                         disproportionate amount of 25.8% y/y. It’s not  away with it) to keep at least some of its crude
                         at all clear how much of that traffic consisted of  oil moving into Europe. It already knows how to  The EU will also
                         Russian crude shipments to Asia, as the SCA  do so, and it has an incentive to keep serving its
                         doesn’t provide full breakdowns of the numbers  European customers (and avoid the headache of   have incentives
                         it makes public. But in all likelihood, Russian oil  an abrupt shift to Asia) if it can.  not to work too
                         cargoes did account for some of the upswing.  At the same time, the EU will also have incen-
                                                              tives not to work too hard to enforce sanctions,   hard to enforce
                         Keeping Europe’s door open           assuming that it does adopt them. It will be
                         Even so, assuming that the EU does introduce  motivated by the desire to assuage the concerns   sanctions,
                         sanctions, Russia is not likely to shift every last  of member states that lack easy alternatives to
                         drop of the oil it has been exporting to Europe  Russian oil supplies – including those such as   assuming that it
                         by sea to Asia (and, to a lesser extent, Africa) in  Hungary and Slovakia, which may be granted   does adopt them.
                         the short term.                      exemptions from the ban. It will also be moti-
                           Making a shift in direction of this magnitude  vated by the desire to stave off the social and
                         would present extraordinary challenges for  economic disruption that might follow energy
                         all of the parties involved. Finding the tankers  shortages. And in the end, it might also be moti-
                         needed to move the oil would be difficult. Find-  vated simply by the lack of political will to take
                         ing the credit needed to finance the deals (and  the kind of action needed to chase down every
                         the banks to handle the transactions, especially  European company with direct or indirect ties
                         now that Russian access to capital markets has  to Russia’s oil sector.
                         been restricted) would be difficult too. Finding   In any event, even with sanctions, the EU will
                         the incentives needed to convince potential buy-  continue to import some Russian crude – less
                         ers to ignore pressure from the West to join the  than it has been doing, but some.™



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