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78 Opinion
the EU banking union through a common deposit insurance
mechanism. But this should not be taken for granted either.
Reticence on fiscal integration does not really change the nature of the game for CESEE member states, which remain net beneficiaries of EU cohesion funds, even if most of them are experiencing a relative decline in the proportion of EU spending they receive under the current EU budget cycle.
Overall, the outlook for CESEE states is slightly negative from the EU perspective. An Ampelkoalition will likely approach other areas of EU policy in ways that might undermine some CESEE member states, both financially and strategically. In this respect, there is likely to be greater overlap with French President Emmanuel Macron – whose En Marche party is
in the same European parliamentary group as the FDP – on questions of geopolitics, defence and the rule of law.
The rule of law: settling scores
The coalition paper spells out that the rule of law is “a central principle internally and externally,” and a key pillar of EU integration. This will have implications for member states deemed to be undermining the rule of law, namely – if not exclusively – Hungary and Poland.
With the departure of the CDU/CSU from government, there is scope for faster punitive action against Hungary and Poland. Outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel did not exactly maintain cordial relations with leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban. Rather than waste time with the federal
“The Ampel parties, especially the Greens and FDP, are united in their desire to promote a foreign policy that puts values at its forefront”
government in Berlin, Orban increasingly went directly to where the money was and his network strong: states such
as Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, where the automotive groups on which Hungary is so reliant are based.
But Merkel trod carefully, fearful of creating a two-tier EU. Furthermore, automotive groups such as Daimler, Opel, BMW and Audi are closely tied with the CDU/CSU, which are historically the custodians of their host states. The departure of the CDU/CSU from the federal government does not mean that the Ampel parties will close their doors to these companies; not least as the SPD has already been in government since 2013. But it does complicate the political dynamics for lobbying.
Again, this is mainly a question of the speed with which sanctions are imposed (and their sequencing) rather than their
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substance. An Ampelkoalition is unlikely to propose anything beyond the suspension of cohesion and NGEU payments under the conditionality mechanism. The Greens mooted over the summer that EU funds to Hungary could even be reduced, but the SPD’s Olaf Scholz dismissed this vague suggestion as being legally impossible.
More significant would be the abolition of unanimous voting at the EU level, which the SPD proposes and over which there is increasing discussion. This could change the political dynamics within the EU very significantly, as it would likely enable the suspension of the voting rights of wayward member states. However, it would likely increase polarisation within the bloc, especially between east and west. That said, Germany could certainly still treat Poland with more caution than Hungary. At least the coalition paper emphasizes the need for close coordination in the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, Poland)
Ostpolitik unchained?
The Ampel parties, especially the Greens and FDP, are united in their desire to promote a foreign policy that puts values at its forefront. This would indicate that relations with Russia and China would deteriorate. More likely, values-based foreign policy will boil down to a question of marketing rather than substance.
For example, the SPD has in recent years attempted to revive its Ostpolitik from the 1970s, expounding a new foreign policy framework that would promote values-based engagement with Russia. But, despite occupying the foreign ministry, the party has failed to comprehensively develop the practical particulars of such an approach. Indeed, it belies the party’s ambivalent stance with respect to Russia, with which it arguably has the best relations (relatively) out of the mainstream parties.
In the coalition paper, there is a brief mention of the
need for Europe to ensure the diversification of its energy supply – in other words, away from Russia, Germany’s primary energy supplier. This is significant rhetoric given Germany’s commitment to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the opposition to which the Greens will likely abandon. Substantive moves in this direction would be very significant for most states in CESEE, the vast majority of which are strongly in favour of diversification.
However, it is unclear which geopolitical steps an Ampelkoalition would proactively take to diversify supply. The outgoing grand coalition supported expanding the infrastructure for importing liquified natural gas (LNG), but the terminals that are envisaged in Brunsbüttel, Wilhelmshaven and Stade are facing questions over their viability.
Outside of Germany, greater commitment to energy diversification could entail that an Ampelkoalition will increase support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which seeks to develop infrastructure across EU-CESEE on a north-