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bne December 2021
Opinion 79
south axis – and to which Germany finally committed in 2021 following years of flip-flopping. As part of 3SI, LNG infrastructure is being developed, but it is more probable that an Ampelkoalition would prioritise the financing of green projects.
As such, the strategic steps that an Ampelkoalition would take to diversify energy supply both domestically and within Europe remain unclear, indicating that there is no clear vision beyond focusing on the development of renewable electricity at home.
Waiting for enlargement
It is noteworthy that the coalition paper does not mention
the enlargement of the EU, let alone the prospects of the Western Balkan states joining. The Greens set out some specific objectives in its election programme, while the SPD paid only lip service and the FDP did not raise the issue at all. This suggests that an Ampelkoalition will continue a policy of passivity on enlargement, supporting it in theory but leaving the stage vacant for states such as France and the Netherlands to capitalise on their relative influence.
Indeed, Germany has squandered considerable amounts
of political capital in the Western Balkans, with the USA remaining the state with the most influence. Individual items, such as visa liberalisation for Kosovar nationals, might inch forward, but an Ampelkoalition would need to commit considerable resources to generate fresh momentum, for which there does not seem to be political will.
Strengthening the core
Based on these indicators, our assessment is that an Ampelkoalition is unlikely to depart radically from the policy continuum. Yet a key variable will be how the ministerial portfolios are divided between the three parties, especially those of finance and foreign affairs.
Overall, German influence within the EU as well as internationally is not likely to increase in comparison with the Merkel era. In CE/SEE it may even possibly decline. Merkel
was a well-known figure here and in large parts of the region respected as an anti-communist lamplight. Merkel also had a deep understanding of Eastern European and Russian history; the new German leadership is likely to be less versed in this and thus possibly understand the region and its problems (even) less.
Nonetheless, the primary implications for CESEE of an Ampelkoalition is that there will be support for measures that, deliberately or otherwise, increase the likelihood that a two- tier EU will emerge. The Western European member states, led by Macron and the Netherlands’ Mark Rutte, have been championing the strengthening of the “core” for some years now, to which Angela Merkel was opposed.
Many of the measures in this respect were likely to have eventually been implemented regardless. But timing is important, and with the faster implementation of punitive measures to uphold the rule of law – including facilitating the potential suspension of the voting rights of EU member states such as Hungary and Poland – divergence is more likely than convergence. Such a scenario could be mitigated by the deepening of interdependence through fiscal integration; however, the FDP is very unlikely to support such measures.
More likely, an Ampelkoalition will remain primarily concerned with domestic issues, namely the strengthening of domestic demand through public investment and ‘pre- distributive’ measures. This is likely to have a positive economic impact for CESEE states even in the event of increasing geopolitical polarisation.
Ultimately, Germany is one (admittedly major) actor in an ensemble cast. Political developments elsewhere will therefore influence its priorities. If the united opposition defeat Orban’s Fidesz party in the Hungarian election in 2022, or the Law and Justice Party in Poland calls snap elections that it loses, this will change the outlook very significantly. Confrontation may then no longer be necessary. Risk-averse foreign policymakers in Germany may then breathe a sigh of relief.
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