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Opinion
March 29, 2019 www.intellinews.com I Page 22
a January poll by Faktor Plus quoted by local Politika newspaper indicated 54% of votes would be cast for the SNS versus only 14% for the Alliance for Serbia opposition group. Other polls have put the SNS’s backing at a lower but still healthy 40-50%.
However, while the opposition are calling for new elections, a vote almost certain to be won by the SNS is unlikely to satisfy them.
“Internally ... the main complaint is the lack of free and fair elections, and specifically what is seen as the illegal and illegitimate concentration of power. Mr Vucic’s rule is viewed as illegal and illegitimate because Serbia is a parliamentary democracy, while Mr Vucic is running the country as if it were a presidential system in which he has the govern- ment and the parliament answer to him,” wrote Vladimir Gligorov of the Vienna Institute for In- ternational Economic Studies (wiiw) in a comment titled “The beginning of legitimacy crisis in Serbia”.
“Mr Vucic’s authoritarianism is therefore not about the inability to win elections, because
he has won several, but the subversion of the constitution. Thus, while Mr Vucic contemplates early elections, perhaps in couple of months, which he would be likely to win, the opposition is getting ready to boycott them.”
The Macedonian situation
Gligorov warns that: “The developments are starting to look like those in Macedonia [recently renamed North Macedonia] which eventually
led to a change of government.” In Macedonia too, the government headed by Nikola Gruevski repeatedly won elections, in the latter years
at least partly because of its control the administration. However, as these were not seen as free and fair by the opposition, they resorted
instead to a parliamentary boycott and mass protests that eventually led to international mediation and the appointment of an interim government, followed in turn by a change of government.
However, there are certain differences: “The weakness of the opposition parties is why the Serbian legitimacy crisis is only in its early stages. On the one hand, they have next to nothing to offer to achieve external legitimacy, in stark contrast to the Macedonian case, while they hope to come to power on the back of the civic uprising that they cannot offer leadership to,” writes Gligorov.
On top of that, there is the question of Serbia’s primary policy goal, accession to the EU. The loss of support from the EU and US were critical to the removal of Gruevski’s government in Macedonia. The government had stalled Macedonia’s progress towards EU and Nato accession through its long standoff with neighbouring Greece, while the opposition said it could offer speedy progress — a promise
it delivered on with the signing of the Prespa Agreement with Athens in 2018.
By contrast, Vucic has consistently maintained EU accession as his government’s top goal,
and looks likely to steer Serbia into the bloc around 2025 if an agreement with Kosovo can be reached. Meanwhile, the Serbian protesters are a mixed band of opponents to Vucic ranging from liberal politicians and intellectuals to far right pro-Russian groups. While they are clear in their stance against authoritarianism and for media freedom, what they can offer in terms of Serbia’s future direction is as yet unclear, making it much harder for them to secure sufficient popular support against the ruling SNS to mount a credible bid for power.