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52 I Eurasia bne March 2018
against Russian gas powerhouse Gazprom for abuse of dominant market position in April 2015.
Much of Russia’s economy has relied
on its gas exports to the EU and Russia’s near monopoly status provides it leverage over gas price determination. It also uses gas exports as a tool for political pressure on Western countries, which indirectly applies to the US, seen by Russia as its primary rival in the geopolitical arena. Its ability to use gas to pressure the West has come in handy following the Ukraine conflict, which saw Western sanctions imposed over the annexation of the Crimea. It follows that Russia would pre- fer to keep its dominant position without any serious rivals in the EU gas market.
It is already set to face competition from Azerbaijan, as gas from the offshore Shah Deniz field is due to reach southern Europe via a new network of pipelines within the next couple of years.
Iranian international law expert Bahman Aghai Diba wrote in January that TCGP “will open the way for more presence of the West
in the Caspian region especially for construction of a pipeline favoured by the EU and the US. Turkmenistan will surely prefer (even forced) to use the Western sources for this project. This is what the Russians do not want.”
Indeed, Central Asia’s former colonial master would prefer the former ex-Soviet states, such as Turkmenistan and Kazakh- stan, to rely on routes through Russia instead of bypassing it. On top of that, Rus- sia already finds itself competing against Turkmenistan in another market – China. Turkmenistan exports most of its gas to China through the Central Asia-China Pipe- line. The country currently exports 30bn cm of natural gas to China annually and aims to boost gas exports to the Chinese to 65bn cm by 2021, helped by the launch of the new Power of Siberia pipeline.
The second major export destination for Turkmen gas is Iran, but a row at the start of this year over a historic debt has caused shipments to the Iranians
to come to a halt. Prior to the Iranian dispute, Russia itself cut gas supplies from Turkmenistan in 2016.
Limited options
If there is a country truly losing out
on lack of access to the European gas market, it’s Turkmenistan itself. At the moment China stands as the country’s sole gas importer and the country is currently suffering as a result of low world hydrocarbon prices. The only real alternative Turkmenistan has at the moment is the ongoing construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. The project envisages supplying gas from one of the world's largest fields, Galkynysh, with estimated reserves
of 13.1 trillion cm of natural gas, to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan. The involvement of the latter, however, puts this project’s prospects at risk
due to security concerns, though the project is meant to enter its Afghan stage this month.
All in all, the prospects for both Turk- menistan and its European pipeline ambitions look bleak – unless the ex- Soviet country manages to find common ground with Russia over the issue.
Uzbek President Mirziyoyev sacks veteran security chief Inoyatov
Nizom Khodjayev in Almaty
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzi- yoyev has sacked National Secu- rity Service (SNB) chief Rustam Inoyatov, a powerful veteran who held his post for 23 years. Inoyatov, who is known both as Uzbekistan's “last Stalin- ist politician" and as the “kingmaker” for playing a decisive role in ensuring Mirziyoyev succeeded the late longtime autocrat Islam Karimov in September 2016, was replaced at a meeting held
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on January 31, state and private media reported.
His departure was officially portrayed as voluntary, but there is enough evidence to suggest he was driven from his post. Sometimes seen as a rival to Mirziyoyev and notoriously shy of publicity, it seems Inoyatov has fallen victim to the presi- dent's campaign to purge officials left over from predecessor Karimov and sur-
Mirziyoyev may have made his most meaningful move yet in consolidating his power.
round himself with his allies. Given how many noses Mirziyoyev has put of joint with his extensive economic, human rights and media reforms in the past year, that may be a make or break ploy.
At a gathering at the SNB headquarters on January 31, the Uzbek leader harshly criticised the security service in front
of a crowd made up of lawmakers, foreign diplomats as well as local and


































































































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