Page 64 - bne_Magazine_March_2018

64 Opinion
bne March 2018
2. Expanding the East-West Highway, Georgia’s main land road transport, in cooperation with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other organisations.
China has been testing the South Caucasus route since the announcement of the OBOR initiative in 2013. For example, in 2015 the connection efficacy between the Xinjiang province of China to the port of Poti in Georgia, via Kazakhstan and
“Tbilisi wants to use growing Chinese influence to further balance Moscow’s military power”
Azerbaijan, was tested. Railway cargo loaded in China on 29th of January and arrived in Georgia on 6th of February of the same year. However, almost a third of the time in transit was spent handling administrative obstacles.
Despite the advantages Georgia has as a transit country there are still numerous questions. China still remains ambivalent about the Caucasian stretch of the Silk Road. True, Beijing
is interested in the strategic relevance of the region, but it nevertheless recognises that commercial engagement remains tentative.
The South Caucasus route remains a side show amongst the major transit and trade routes China is investing in.
Analysts do forget that the South Caucasus route does not feature much in the following corridors anticipated under the BRI initiative:
1. China to Europe through New Eurasian Land Bridge; 2. China-Mongolia-Russian Corridor;
3. Central and West Asian countries.
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, mainly relies on Chinese coastal ports:
4. China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor and link China with the South Pacific Ocean through the South China Sea;
5. China-Pakistan trade corridor;
6. Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar trade route.
Compared to major Chinese-financed infrastructure
and energy works completed in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in the past two years, state-owned Chinese companies have yet to secure any similar scale projects in the Caucasus region. Indeed, Chinese are building major road and railway infrastructure in Uzbekistan and are extensively investing in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Georgia, for the moment, Beijing is largely interested in the existing and upcoming infrastructure and is investing into construction
in Tbilisi, Kutaisi and other major cities.
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Tbilisi sees intensive relations with China as another tool to diminish Russian resurgence. The country needs Chinese investment that will create jobs and profits.
So far the Chinese have built a new city on the outskirts of Tbilisi, have invested in Kutaisi – the second-largest city in the country - and own three quarters of the shares of Poti’s free industrial zone. The importance of investments in Tbilisi and Kutaisi can be questioned but the Poti investment is a significant one.
An observer can see a clear east-west line to the Black Sea dotted with Chinese investments. But it remains hard to say what China’s moves will be in the future. However, as Russian forces move up to the demarcation line of the breakaway South Ossetia and closer to the east-west highway, China will become worried. Beijing will either have to find a consensus with Russia or get more involved security-wise. And there is already a precedent. For example, in Central Asia China has made some steps, which potentially could challenge Russia's economic and political influence in the region.
We know that China is already the largest trade partner of each of the Central Asian states and that Beijing has deepened its military and security ties with Tajikistan and partly with Kyrgyzstan mainly by holding military exercises and building military infrastructure on the Tajik-Afghan border.
For Tbilisi it will be a boon to its security if China is more involved in the South Caucasus. However, for the moment it might be only wishful thinking that China will openly confront Russia anytime soon. Even in Central Asia, despite inroads, Moscow still does not say it openly that Beijing is compromising the existing order.
Another reason to think that Georgia will not so easily become a land for the confrontation between China and Russia is the fact that the country is only a small piece in China's OBOR.
Also, although Beijing will pay more attention to the region
it may not actively invest resources into Georgian security beyond law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation, as in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This would be the case especially if its actions would clash with Russia's. There are simply several other transit routes too in China’s BRI grand project.
Thus the situation for the moment could be characterized as mixed. Beijing is definitely increasing its economic influence in Georgia. However, the investments are not on a par with Chinese actions in the Central Asia or Pakistan.
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles focused on military and political developments across the Eurasian continent.