Page 44 - Ray Dalio - Principles
P. 44

people,  not  something  thoughtful  people  took  seriously.  But  I  had
                      studied  debt  and  depressions  back  to  1800,  done  my  calculations,
                      and was confident that the debt crisis led by emerging countries was
                      coming.  I  had  to  share  my  thinking  with  my  clients.  Because  my
                      views were so controversial I asked others to track my reasoning and
                      point out to me where it was bad. No one could find any flaws in my
                      logic, though they were all reluctant to endorse my conclusion.

                         Because  I  believed  that  the  choice  was  between  accelerating
                      inflation  and  deflationary  depression,  I  was  holding  both  gold
                      (which  performs  well  in  accelerating  inflation)  and  bonds  (which
                      perform well in deflationary depressions). Up until that point, gold
                      and bonds had moved in opposite directions, depending on whether
                      inflation expectations rose or fell. Holding those positions seemed
                      much  safer  than  holding  alternatives  like  cash,  which  would  lose
                      value in an inflation environment, or stocks, which would crash in a
                      depression.

                         At  first,  the  markets  went  against  me.  But  my  experience  with
                      silver and other trades had taught me that I had a chronic problem
                      with timing, so I believed I was just early and what I was expecting
                      would happen soon. That didn’t take long to happen. By the fall of
                      1981,  the  tight  Fed  policies  were  having  a  devastating  effect,  my
                      bond  bets  were  beginning  to  pay  off,  and  my  kooky  views  were
                      starting  to  look  right  on.  In  February  1982,  the  Fed  temporarily
                      added liquidity to avoid a cash crunch. In June, as the scramble for
                      liquidity  intensified,  the  Fed  responded  by  printing  money,
                      increasing  liquidity  to  its  highest  level  since  Paul  Volcker’s
                      appointment. But it still wasn’t enough.



                             THE GREATEST WHIPSAW EVER



                      In August 1982, Mexico defaulted on its debt. By then, it was clear
                      to  most  everyone  that  a  number  of  other  countries  were  about  to
                      follow. This was a huge deal, because U.S. banks had lent about 250
                      percent of their capital to other countries just as at risk as Mexico.
                      Business loan activity in the U.S. ground to a halt.

                         Because I was one of the few people who had seen these things
                      coming,  I  started  to  get  a  lot  of  attention.  Congress  was  holding
                      hearings on the crisis and invited me to testify; in November I was
                      the  featured  guest  on  Wall  $treet  Week  with  Louis  Rukeyser,  the
                      must-watch show for anyone in the markets. In both appearances, I
   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49