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many of which limited the right to hold political office, to become an officer of the court, or
even to vote to favored religious majorities, such as monotheists, Christians, or Protestant
Christians. Many colonies also excluded Quakers from political participation on the
grounds that they would not take oaths.
While states gradually became more permissive with regard to religious tests over the
years, state-level religious requirements for public office were not abolished entirely until
1961, when the Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins (1961) invalidated Maryland’s
requirement that all public officeholders declare belief in the existence of God (see section
on religious minorities below).
The Free Speech Clause. Although these three clauses represent the constitutional
provisions that explicitly protect religious freedom, they are probably not the most
frequently invoked protections. Because so much religious activity entails speech or
communication, and because of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply the Free Exercise
Clause vigorously in recent years, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has
played an especially prominent role in the constitutional protection of religious
freedom.7 The Supreme Court has rebuffed repeated attempts to exclude religious speech
from the protection of the Free Speech Clause, citing the nation’s early history of
suppressing unpopular religious views.8
Core Understandings
What precisely have these protections amounted to, as interpreted by the courts and by
Congress? Over the years, several core understandings of the constitutional protection of
religion have emerged.
No religious coercion. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause to
prohibit American governments from coercion in religious speech. They may not compel
citizens to engage in religious speech or compel any speech that would violate religious
conscience.9 Nor may the government exclude speech from a governmental forum simply
because it reflects a religious viewpoint.10 Finally, under the Free Speech Clause, religious
organizations enjoy at least the same right as secular “expressive associations” to choose
people for leadership and membership in their group based on whether those people
share the views the group exists to express.11
The Supreme Court has also construed the Establishment Clause to bar the government
from coercing citizens to participate in religious services, adopting a very broad
conception of what it means to “coerce” participation.12 The Establishment Clause has
also been understood to forbid forced tithing, particularly for the funding of seminaries,
which has been a controversial practice of governments with established churches.13 More
broadly, the court has acknowledged the principle that citizens should not be forced
through taxation to provide direct financial support to religious instruction or worship with
which they may disagree.14 This represents a narrow exception to the general rule that
citizens may not sue the government based on objections to its use of their tax
money.15 The court has ruled, however, that the government must not go so far as to
exclude religious people or institutions from government benefits simply because of their
religious status or beliefs, lest it engage in religious discrimination.16
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