Page 161 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

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means to punish both media and citizens for imposing accountability. Fear of reper-
cussions, in turn, constrained efforts to reduce the country’s pervasive corruption,
recognized as a major impediment to economic development and an indicator that
democratic transition was stagnating.
Despite setbacks for transparency and free speech, Indonesia’s ranking on the
Corruption Perceptions Index improved steadily over time, suggesting some long-
term impact from reformists’ efforts, particularly those of the Corruption Eradication
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), established six years earlier.
28
Somewhat surprisingly, not long after its inception in 2003, this body evolved into
an effective institution—an anomaly among other government bodies and a notable
break from a string of toothless predecessors.
29
Though its origins lay in demands from reformasi activists, passage of the
legislation that brought the KPK into being was influenced as much by intraelite
conflict as any desire for reform. Back in 1998, when anti-Suharto momentum
had been at its peak, pressure from students, journalists, international donors,
and nongovernmental organizations had forced Indonesia’s highest legislative
body, the MPR, to pass a decree, “Clean Governance Free from Corruption, Col-
lusion and Nepotism,” that directed the DPR to fulfill its anticorruption man-
date. Several initiatives resulted, but each failed from a lack of powers, funding,
or both.
30
Nonetheless, one such initiative created in 2000 under President Wahid, the
Wealth Audit Board, began imposing limited transparency. When it started investi-
gating wealth held by Megawati’s family, the new president was quick to replace it
with a body she believed she could control. In short, though Megawati gained credit
for signing the 2002 bill that created the KPK, her motivations were both “politi-
cal vengeance” and self-protection from the very scrutiny the KPK was designed
to impose. Yet armed with surprisingly strong powers, including surveillance,
31
wiretapping, access to bank and tax information, the authority to arrest suspects,
and an unprecedented requirement to pursue all cases to prosecution, the KPK ulti-
mately became a powerful ally of independent media and civil society, and a thorn
in Megawati’s side.
32
Through its ongoing investigations of official malfeasance, the KPK also mitigated
the criminalization of critical speech by allowing journalists more leeway to report on
official corruption cases and provide the commission with information gathered from
their own investigations. Political rivalries and self-serving motives also facilitated the
KPK’s collection of evidence.
By July 2009, the KPK claimed a 100-percent conviction rate in eighty-six brib-
ery and graft cases. With these successes and an apparent commitment to pro-
33
tecting the public interest, the KPK won strong support among the Indonesian
middle class, even though the total of eighty-six cases over a six-year period was
hardly significant in a country ranked at the time among the most corrupt in the
world. As political observer Aristides Katoppo noted, “You know, with corrup-
34
tion in Indonesia, if you start operating on this patient, you will have nothing left
on the body.”
35
The KPK’s record nevertheless helped General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono build
his reform credentials after his election to the presidency in 2004, propelling him to
reelection five years later. But like Megawati, President Yudhoyono was guilty of cor-
ruption, including campaign finance fraud, prompting the KPK to investigate him and