Page 167 - SCANDAL AND DEMOCRACY

152 Chapter 8

Whether by sudden coup or slow accretion of collusive pacts, a democratic
transition’s reversal can occur at virtually any point after the fall of an authoritar-
ian regime—immediately, with the reconstitution of an old guard coalition (military,
cronies, or an alliance of both), or later, through a leader identified with the previous
order who plays upon mass disappointment with democracy and sentimentality for
the bygone era. Though the political response to such threats varies widely, successful
opposition usually entails some combination of intraelite conflict, mass mobilization,
and media exposé. Admittedly, such synergies operate in comparatively few countries.
But these few also happen to be some of the world’s more democratic and dynamic
nations—whether in Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea), Africa (Tunisia,
South Africa), or Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Mexico).
Among these cases, three share notable similarities with Indonesia, particularly
in the ways that major scandals and the media more broadly have influenced their
trajectories toward democratization. After seven decades of one-party rule, Mexico
experienced a recent democratic transition in which the media played a central role.
In a detailed study of this volatile process, Chappell Lawson found that liberalization
of the media was a powerful force. Of equal import, a series of government scandals
that the media aired in a kind of “feeding frenzy” was critical to voters’ turn against
the entrenched regime. Not only did the scandals of the 1990s damage the regime’s
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legitimacy, but their “rapid succession,” instead of producing voter fatigue or cyni-
cism, appeared “to indict the system as a whole” and thereby generate demand for
more fundamental change. Moreover, Lawson continues, “scandals signaled to politi-
cal elites that the rules of the game had changed and that certain older practices would
now be exposed to public scrutiny. More aggressive media coverage thus created a
new context for political decision making.”
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The rising political uncertainty and these media-driven scandals finally pushed
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party from the presidency in 2000, breaking
the seventy-one-year lock on power that had made Mexico a one-party autocracy. The
democratic transition that followed suffered from many of the problems that Indo-
nesia faced, particularly a steady pull toward reversal through corruption and skillful
maneuvering by the old guard to retain power and position. The victorious opposition
candidate, Vicente Fox, had campaigned on a promise to exterminate the “scorpions,
vermin, and snakes” associated with the ruling party, but a continuing grip on state
governorships preserved the nexus of patronage that had long been the foundation for
its rule. After just twelve years out of power, the Institutional Revolutionary Party and
its mediagenic candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, built upon that local base to capture
the presidency in 2012 and restore the party’s systemic corruption.
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Reporting on this restoration in 2015, the economic analyst Rodrigo Aguilera
presented a grim assessment of Mexico’s prospects, using the term “the Mexican dis-
ease” to describe the factors that have impeded democratic consolidation, including
barriers to social mobility, entrenched rent seeking, cultural acceptance of corruption,
and symbiotic relationships between politicians and drug cartels. Aguilero offered
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little hope, observing that Peña Nieto, the ruling party, and the rest of the power
structure appeared impervious to pressure for change, even in the face of spectacular
breaking scandals, including revelations that a crony favored with billions in govern-
ment contracts had built a $4-million house for the first lady in the capital’s most
exclusive neighborhood.
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This assessment, however, appears to have been unduly pessimistic. In the face
of this scandal and a succession of similar exposés, the president’s approval ratings