Page 58 - May June 2019 TPA Journal

reviewed de novo. We view the evidence “in the checkpoint was that the police stopped the
light most favorable to the prevailing party”— motorist for questioning. Drivers could not ignore
here, Wise. the officers or decline to answer questions. Thus
the law enforcement officer forced the motorist to
The district court concluded that the Conroe interact with the authorities.
Police Department’s decision to stop Greyhound
Bus #6408 constituted an unconstitutional The Supreme Court’s other cases discussing
checkpoint stop. Accordingly, the court checkpoints similarly involved government
suppressed all evidence the police obtained officials initiating the stop. Lidster involved the
subsequent to the stop. The court characterized a police “block[ing] the eastbound lanes of the
checkpoint stop as: “a police program in which highway,” “forc[ing] traffic to slow down,” and—
officers gather at a specific place and, following a when each vehicle passed through the
department-issued script, briefly speak to drivers checkpoint—“stop[ping] [the vehicle] for 10 to 15
without having any reason to suspect seconds.” Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422
wrongdoing.” The court asserted that the essence (2004). Sitz involved a situation where: “[a]ll
of an unconstitutional checkpoint stop is the vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be
forced interaction between an officer and a stopped [by the police] and their drivers briefly
motorist. Moreover, the court found that examined for signs of intoxication.” Sitz, 496 U.S.
checkpoint stops are only permissible “if they are at 447. And Martinez–Fuerte involved a
for a narrow particular law enforcement purpose permanent immigration checkpoint stationed by
directly connected to the use of the roads.” law enforcement officers that brought traffic “to a
According to the court, permissible law virtual, if not a complete, halt.” United States v.
enforcement purposes include removing drunk Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546 (1976)
drivers, verifying licenses, and conducting (footnote omitted). This line of checkpoint
immigration checkpoints near the border; cases—and the apparent concern with the
checkpoints cannot be used “merely to uncover government initiating the stop and forcing
evidence of ordinary crimes.” Under this motorists to interact—stems from an essential
characterization, the district court concluded that principle recognized in Terry: the essence of an
the bus interdiction constituted an unconstitutional seizure is that a government
unconstitutional checkpoint. First, the police official has restrained a citizen’s liberty. See Terry
forced the bus driver to interact with them. The v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“Only when
officers knew that Greyhound mandated that its [an] officer, by means of physical force or show of
bus drivers stop at specific locations for loading authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
and unloading passengers. The Greyhound a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has
schedule was publicly available, and the police occurred.”).
exploited it. Thus, “[w]hen the bus driver saw the
police waiting, he could not avoid them. Second, Here, the Conroe Police Department did not
the checkpoint’s purpose was impermissible establish an unconstitutional checkpoint. The
because the police sought “to uncover evidence of police did not require the bus driver to stop at the
ordinary crimes, like possession of narcotics.” station. The driver made the scheduled stop as
required by his employer, Greyhound. The police
The district court incorrectly characterized the bus only approached the driver after he had
interdiction as an unconstitutional checkpoint. disembarked from the bus. The police did not
The Supreme Court’s Edmond opinion illustrates order him to interact with them; after the police
the court’s error. The checkpoint in Edmond approached him, the driver could have declined to
involved “roadblocks.” A central feature of the

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