Page 39 - September October 2020 TPA Journal
P. 39
information and would understand that a “com- of their prior convictions, Staggers and Session
plete” cell phone search refers not just to a physi- each received a mandatory term of life in prison
cal examination of the phone, but further contem- due to the jury’s verdict on the conspiracy charge
plates an inspection of the phone’s “complete” and its drug-quantity finding. Several weeks after
contents. A typical reasonable owner of a cell they were sentenced, Congress passed the First
phone would also realize that permission to seize Step Act, which reduced the mandatory minimum
“materials” includes permission to seize (and sentence applicable to defendants like Staggers
examine) such information. and Session. On appeal, Staggers and Session
argue that they should be resentenced, since their
Gallegos proffers a few reasons to depart from the
plainly broad terms of the consent form, but none convictions were not final when the First Step Act
is convincing. We thus hold that the government’s became effective. We conclude, however, that the
extraction of data and later review of that data did relevant provisions of the First Step Act do not
not exceed the scope of consent as plainly, unmis- apply to defendants who were sentenced before
takably, and voluntarily set out in the consent the Act’s effective date.
agreement. Because the scope of consent was the
only basis for evidentiary suppression argued on In addition to finding Staggers and Session guilty
of conspiracy, the jury found all three defendants
appeal, we hold that the district court’s suppres-
guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which
sion of evidence was reversible error.
prohibits convicted felons from possessing
firearms. When the district court tried this case,
To sum up: the only issue presented by this appeal
concerns the scope of Gallegos’s consent. The our precedent—along with precedent from every
consent was broad—broad enough fairly to cover other circuit court to have considered the issue—
the search and seizure of cell phone data that held that knowledge of one’s felon status was not
occurred here. Although Gallegos urges us to dis- an element of a § 922(g)(1) offense. The Supreme
regard or modify the broad terms of his voluntary Court overruled this precedent while this appeal
consent, he has offered no persuasive reason for was pending, so Staggers and Morrison now con-
our doing so. tend that they are entitled to a new trial. We hold
Accordingly, the district court’s suppression order that they are not so entitled.
is REVERSED and VACATED, and the case is Finally, we address several issues, each of which
REMANDED for further proceedings not incon- affects only one defendant. Morrison argues that
sistent with this opinion. the warrantless search of his home was not con-
U.S. V. GALLEGOS-ESPINAL, No. 19-20427, sensual and that the district court should therefore
FIFTH CIRCUIT, Aug. 17th, 2020. have granted his motion to suppress the fruits of
that search. Session, meanwhile, contends that
one of the district court’s evidentiary rulings was
SEARCH & SEIZURE. CONSENT an abuse of discretion and that there was legally
SEARCH. insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that
he knew or reasonably should have known that
Andre Staggers, Leonard Morrison, and Corey the conspiracy involved one kilogram or more of
Session were jointly indicted and tried in a drug- heroin.
conspiracy prosecution. Staggers and Session
were found guilty of the charged conspiracy, but We conclude that Morrison’s argument regarding
Morrison was found not guilty. The jury also his motion to suppress is the only single-defen-
found that both Staggers and Session knew or rea- dant issue having any merit. At the suppression
sonably should have known that the conspiracy hearing, the district court heard testimony setting
involved one kilogram or more of heroin. Because out two very different versions of events regard-
Sept.-Oct. 2020 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • (512) 458-3140 35
