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handlebars. Those there . . . will stand out . . . been, [wa]s, or [wa]s about to be engaged in
because they’re not normal.” criminal activity.”
“But the success or failure of a suppression
motion cannot hinge on an officer Finally, our dissenting colleague asserts that
saying, in essence, ‘I know it when I see it.’” the stop was justified because Alvarez “fle[d],”
Unable to point to specific identifiers, the “abscond[ed],” and “deliberately evaded” the
government has not shown that Alvarez’s officers. Not so. If any of that were true, this
handlebars were sufficiently distinctive to case would be governed by Illinois v.
create reasonable suspicion. Wardlow,. There, Wardlow—while standing in
an area known for drug dealing and “holding
The location fares no better. The officers knew an opaque bag”— saw patrolling officers and
only that the subject had previously been seen “fled,” running through a “gangway and an
in the Leopard–Up River area and “may be” alley” before being stopped. This “[h]eadlong
there. They had no information whatsoever flight” was, the Court explained, “the
about where in the area he had been consummate act of evasion[,]” justifying the
seen11 or when he had been seen there— officers “in suspecting that Wardlow was
whether “that day,” “the day before,” or “the involved in criminal activity.”
week before.” Nor did they have reason to
believe he might still have been in the area— Wardlow is nothing like this case. Alvarez was
for example, if he resided there. not “absconding” or “fleeing” from the
police—he was already riding his bicycle
The government also relies on the area being when Officer Deleon spotted him, and he
known by the officers for gang activity. It is true ignored the officers and kept riding when
that “officers are not required to ignore the asked to stop. He had every right to do so.
relevant characteristics of a location in (“[W]hen an officer, without reasonable
determining whether the circumstances are suspicion or probable cause, approaches an
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further individual, the individual has a right to ignore
investigation,” and so “the fact that the police and go about his business.”
the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
among the relevant contextual considerations (1983)). So, “this is not a case of
in a Terry analysis.” Still, “[a]n individual’s headlong flight at the mere sight of a police
presence in an area of expected criminal officer.” If there were any doubt, the
activity, standing alone, is not enough to government conceded at oral argument that
support a reasonable, particularized suspicion this case is not Wardlow.
that the person is committing a crime.”
Something more is needed— some observed The government further defends the stop by
fact beyond the person’s mere presence that arguing the description, location, and gang
gives an officer “reasonable, articulable activity were “identified in the information
suspicion that the person has been, is, or is obtained by the officers during the gang
about to be engaged in criminal activity.” That roundup investigation,” citing the collective
is where the government stumbles. Beyond knowledge doctrine. We disagree.
Alvarez’s presence in a high-crime area, it
points to no fact suggesting that Alvarez “ha[d] “[R]easonable suspicion can vest through the
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