Page 17 - Police Officer's Guide 2013

After securing a search warrant from a magistrate, Officer Bain extracted a blood sample from
Huddleston and charged him with DWI.

Huddleston filed motion to suppress the evidence based upon the argument that the detention was not
supported by probable cause. The motion was denied by the District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of interactions between police
officers and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests. Unlike investigative detentions and
arrests, which are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes, an encounter is a consensual interaction that the
citizen is free to terminate at any time. The dispositive question is whether the totality of the circumstances
shows that the police conduct at issue would have caused a reasonable person to believe that he was free to
decline the officer s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. If a reasonable person would feel free to
terminate the encounter, the police-citizen contact is merely a consensual encounter and does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment. Circumstances that may indicate that a police-citizen interaction is a seizure, rather than a
consensual encounter, include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer s requests might be compelled.

No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter becomes a seizure. Generally, however, when
an officer through force or a showing of authority restrains a citizens liberty, the encounter is no longer
consensual. Generally, however, when an officer through force or a showing of authority restrains a citizens
liberty, the encounter is no longer consensual. (ed. note: citations omitted from the above passages).

Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that a particular person is, has been,
or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. (ed. note: This is a good reminder for officers preparing reports
involving detentions or any other actions based upon the reasonable suspicion standard!!)

The Court went on to hold in this case that Bain was justified in approaching Huddlestons vehicle and
inspecting the situation. A citizen reported at 2:45 a.m. on July 5, 2008, that a white Ford Ranger had been parked
on the side of the road with its 8 lights on for more than an hour. Officer Bain was dispatched to the reported
location and observed the described vehicle. Officer Bain did not know whether someone in the vehicle was in
distress, but the circumstances warranted further investigation. Bain was justified in approaching Huddlestons
vehicle and inspecting the situation. A citizen reported at 2:45 a.m. on July 5, 2008, that a white Ford Ranger had
been parked on the side of the road with its lights on for more than an hour. Officer Bain was dispatched to the
reported location and observed the described vehicle. Officer Bain did not know whether someone in the vehicle
was in distress, but the circumstances warranted further investigation. We conclude that Officer Bains initial
interaction with Huddleston was a consensual police-citizen encounter that did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment.

Officer Bain could not temporarily detain Huddleston beyond the initial encounter, however, without
reasonable suspicion. In the early morning hours following the July Fourth holiday, Officer Bain arrived at the
scene to see a vehicle parked on the side of a busy roadway, with its lights on, its engine running, and Huddleston
sleeping inside with two beer cans within reach. Immediately after waking Huddleston, Officer Bain noticed
Huddlestons disorientation, his bloodshot and watery eyes, the odor of alcohol on his breath, and his instability
when he exited the vehicle. Based on a totality of the circumstances, Officer Bain had sufficient articulable facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that Huddleston had been engaged in criminal activity. He was therefore
justified in temporarily detaining Huddleston to conduct further investigation.

We hold that Officer Bains initial approach and contact with Huddleston did not violate the Fourth

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 10 2013 Edition