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someone inside the residence was constantly watching the video feed such that they would be aware of the
officers desire to speak and enter. In congruence with these facts, the district court described the area as a
covered porch, a finding that, based on the evidence, is not clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, as in Thomas, members of the public would reasonably believe they had to enter the first
threshold of the building to knock on the interior set of doors to obtain the attention of the residents and access
the dwelling. The space entered by the police without consent or a warrant was thus not one that harbors the
intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a mans home and the privacies of life.

The Fifth Circuit concluded that the area inside the first set of barn doors but outside the interior doors
was not part of the curtilage, so the police did not violate Cookes Fourth Amendment rights by entering the area
without consent or a warrant.

The consent issue: In Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court held that, although co-tenants generally
have the ability to consent to search, a physically present inhabitants express refusal of consent to a police
search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant. Id. at 122-23. Cooke sought to
have the Fifth Circuit extend Randolph to his situation, where a physically absent tenant refuses to give consent
while a physically present cotenant grants consent.

In contrast to the defendant in Randolph, Cooke was not a present and objecting cotenant but rather was
many miles away from his home in jail when he objected to the search. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court
has directly addressed the situation of whether an absent defendants objection vitiates the consent of a physically
present cotenant. Several sister circuits, however, have spoken: The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have permitted
searches under similar circumstances; the Ninth Circuit has invalidated such searches.

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that the objection of an absent cotenant
does not vitiate the consent of a physically present cotenant under Randolph. In sum, Randolph applies only to
searches conducted in the face of a present and objecting cotenant.

th
U.S. v. Cooke, No. 10-20422, 5 Cir., March 13, 2012.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE. WARRANTS. COMPUTER SEARCHES.

Triplett pled guilty under a plea agreement to possession of child pornography. His plea was conditioned
on retaining the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. Triplett claims the search
warrant that led officers to the pornography violated the Fourth Amendments particularity and probable cause
requirements. His conviction is affirmed.

The evidence supporting Tripletts conviction resulted from what began as a state missing-persons
investigation. Triplett reported to the Lowndes County Sheriff s Department that his stepdaughter Kaila Morris
was missing. The report was made on September 18, 2009, after his wife Bonnie (who is Kaila Morriss mother)
asked him to call. Morris was a student at Mississippi State University. The night before the sheriff was
contacted, she had been visiting her parents home in Columbus, Mississippi. At 3:44 p.m., Morris last used her
cellular phone and Triplett reports that she left home at 8 p.m. in a dark colored vehicle he did not recognize.
Supposedly she left to visit a friend in Alabama. Morris has not been heard from since.

Authorities obtained a search warrant from a Lowndes County Justice Court judge on September 23,
2009. It authorized the seizure at Tripletts house of [a]ny and all articles of clothing of Kaila Morris, bed sheets,
electronic devices, electronic memory devices, cell phones, DNA, hand digging and cutting tools, vehicles, and

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 48 2013 Edition