Page 79 - Police Officer's Guide 2013

Further, the undisputed testimony provides circumstantial evidence tending to connect Campbell to the
messages. The undisputed testimony yields the following: (1) Campbell had a Facebook account; (2) only he and
Ana ever had access to his Facebook account; and (3) Ana received the messages bearing Campbells name. This
evidence suggests that only Campbell or Ana could have authored the messages received in Anas Facebook
account. In addition, Ana told the jury that she could not access Campbells account, and therefore, she did not
send the messages to herself. While this evidence certainly does not conclusively establish that Campbell
authored the messagesin fact, Campbell insisted that he did notthe State was not required to rule out all
possibilities inconsistent with authenticity or prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.
See Manuel, 357 S.W.3d at 74 (quoting Chin, 371 F.3d at 37). So long as the authenticity of the proffered
evidence was at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the jury was entitled to weigh the credibility
of these witnesses and decide who was telling the truth. See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638, 645-46 (explaining that
conceivably someone could have concocted appellants MySpace page [b]ut that is an alternate scenario whose
likelihood and weight the jury was entitled to assess once the State had produced a prima facie showing that it
was appellant, and not some unidentified conspirators or fraud artists, who created and maintained these
MySpace pages).

Campbell v. State, No. 03-11-00834-CR , Ct. App. Austin, Aug. 31, 2012.

DUI TRIAL EVIDENCE OF ARRESTING OFFICERS PRIOR SUSPENSION BRADY
MATERIAL?

At a jury trial resulting in conviction of Baldez, the District Judge did not allow evidence of the arresting
officer s prior suspension for for violating department rules at a crime scene by taking evidence and concealing
such fact, and the evidence, from his superiors. Baldez lawyer argued that the suspension and underlying
circumstances went to the credibility of the officer and should have been admitted.

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by opinion or reputation evidence, or by proof of a
conviction for a felony or a crime of moral turpitude. Aside from proof of a conviction for a felony or a crime of
moral turpitude, a witnesss general character for truthfulness may not be attacked by evidence of specific
instances of conduct. Specific instances of conduct may, however, be admissible for the purpose of attacking a
witnesss trustworthiness in a particular case because of bias or interest. The appellant has the burden of showing
the relevance of particular evidence to the issue of bias or prejudice.

Here, Baldez sought to introduce the disciplinary report for the sole purpose of showing Rubios lack of
credibility; Baldez never argued that Rubio was untrustworthy due to bias or interest against Baldez. Rule
608(b) expressly prohibits the introduction of specific instances of conduct to attack a witnesss credibility.
[T]here is an important distinction between an attack on the general credibility of a witness and a more particular
attack on credibility that reveals possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate
directly to issues or personalities of the case at hand.

Because Baldez sought to impeach Rubios credibility with proof of the disciplinary report, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination.

Baldez also argues that his right to due process was violated when the State failed to disclose Officer
Rubios disciplinary suspension. Under Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose all
material exculpatory evidence to the defense.

We disagree that a Brady violation exists in this case. To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must
show that (1) the State suppressed evidence, (2) the suppressed evidence favors the defendant, and (3) there is

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 72 2013 Edition