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purpose (such as to look for a particular person or object), the scope of the consent to enter normally includes
consent to search those areas in which the person or object would reasonably be found. But the person who
consents to the entry may specifically limit or revoke his consent.

The trial courts fact findings and conclusions of law state that the officers presence in the apartment at
the time they found the illegal substance was permissible as part of their investigation for domestic violence. But
the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the record did not support this. Although it is undisputed that the
officers initial entry into the apartment was part of their investigation for domestic violence, it is also undisputed
that they found no evidence of domestic abuse, appellant told them to leave four times, and the only reason that
they did not leave was because they were waiting for a return on the warrant check on appellant. The officers
explanation for refusing to leave before they received the warrant check was, essentially, But we always do it
that way. This is insufficient justification for their continued presence, as is the states argument that remaining
in appellants apartment was appropriate because the entire encounter was very shortunder six minutes.

The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial courts factual finding that the police presence in
the appellants apartment was part of a reasonable domestic-violence investigation is accurate with respect to the
officers initial entry, but it does not support a legal conclusion that the officers were still completing their
investigation of domestic violence at the time they remained in appellants apartment while waiting for a return
on the warrant check and at the time that the illegal substance was found. At that point, the appellant had told
them four times to leave, and the officers, by their own admission, were planning to leave the apartment after the
results of the warrant check came back because their domestic-violence investigation had been completed.

The Court held that appellant had revoked her consent to enter, the officers had no probable cause to arrest
her until after the fourth iteration of her revocation of consent, and that, by remaining in her apartment, the
officers were not at a vantage point where they had the right to be.

State v. Miller, No. PD-0705-11, Texas Court of Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2012.

Traffic

TRAFFIC. DRIVING ON SHOULDER OF ROADWAY.

The appellant was driving west on Highway 114 in Boyd. At a railroad crossing, the car in front of him
slowed down, and the appellant used an improved shoulder to pass the slowing car as they crossed the tracks.
Officer Estel was driving east on Highway 114. Estel observed the appellants driving and stopped him for
illegally driving on an improved shoulder.

For reasons not contained in the record, the appellant was arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Prior to his DWI trial, the appellant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop
on the basis that Estels traffic stop was improper because Estel did not have reasonable suspicion that the
appellant had committed a criminal offense.

The appellant argued that his driving was legal under Transportation Code section 545.058(a):

(a) An operator may drive on an improved shoulder to the right of the main traveled portion of a roadway if that
operation is necessary and may be done safely, but only:
(1) to stop, stand, or park;
(2) to accelerate before entering the main traveled lane of traffic;
(3) to decelerate before making a right turn;

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 80 2013 Edition