Page 46 - TPA Journal July August 2022
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victim said that Appellant told her, constitute a    court must “consider the combined and cumulative
        verbal threat?” We ordered the parties to brief this  force of all admitted evidence and reasonable
        issue, and they have done so.                        inferences therefrom.”  In concluding that it could
                                                             not discern a threat from the victim’s statement that
        The State argues that the statement constituted a    Appellant “told me I need to hit,” the court of
        verbal threat in the context in which it was made—   appeals failed to adhere to these principles.  A
        Grayson being hit by a board, Appellant uttering     rational jury could have concluded that Appellant
        the statement, and Appellant continuing to hit the   verbally conveyed to Grayson that he would
        victim with the board. Appellant contends that the   continue hitting her with the board because he
        words “I need to hit” might or might not constitute  needed to hit her. Appellant’s position is that the
        a threat, depending on the context in which the      utterance “I need to hit” is ambiguous both in the
        words are uttered. The short answer, he says, is, “It  abstract and in the context of his own case. Viewing
        depends.”                                            evidence in the “the light most favorable to the
                                                             prosecution”  ordinarily means resolving any
        Appellant contends that the words do not constitute  ambiguities in the evidence in the prosecution’s
        a threat in his case because they were uttered after  favor.  The evidence is sufficient if “any” rational
        the assault occurred. He further contends that the   trier of fact could have so concluded.  Even
        State offered no nexus to connect the utterance to a  assuming  Appellant is correct that Grayson’s
        verbal assault. He further argues that Grayson’s     rendition of  Appellant’s statement could be
        written statement relating what he said is           construed as an invitation to Grayson to fight back,
        ambiguous and that she could have been saying that   a rational jury did not have to construe it that way.
        Appellant was telling her to hit him back.  He also  A rational jury could have, instead, viewed the
        contends that, because (according to Grayson’s       statement as an expression of the Appellant’s “need
        testimony) he had already commenced hitting her      to hit.” Further, we disagree with  Appellant’s
        with the board, she was already in fear of bodily    characterization of the utterance as occurring after
        injury when he said, “I need to hit.”                the physical assault. The phrase, “I need to hit”
        Appellant cites several cases in which the phrase    occurred during Appellant’s physical assault on
        “I need to hit” was included in a defendant’s        Grayson. Appellant beat her, told her “I need to
        statement as examples of the phrase being a verbal   hit,” and beat her some more. The nexus between
        threat, but he contends that the facts of those cases  the utterance and the physical assault is obvious,
        are distinguishable from the facts of his case       and a rational jury could have concluded that the
        because the words were uttered before any assault.   utterance was a threat to continue physically
        Finally, he argues that threats are “forward         assaulting Grayson—a threat that Appellant carried
        looking” statements about what the actor intends to  out. And contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, the
        do and that the utterance in his case was a          fact that Grayson was already in fear of serious
        “backward looking” statement about why he            bodily injury did not preclude her from being
        physically attacked Grayson.                         threatened again. And even if the statement could
                                                             be construed as a backward-looking explanation for
        We agree with the State that a rational trier of fact  whythe defendant had alreadyhit Grayson, it could
        could have found, under the evidence in this case,   also be seen as a forward-looking statement of
        that the statement “I need to hit” was a verbal      Appellant’s intent to continue to hit her—an intent
        threat. In a sufficiencyreview, the reviewing court  that he carried out. We conclude that a rational jury
        must consider all of the evidence in “the light most  could have concluded that the statement “I need to
        favorable to the prosecution.”  And the reviewing    hit” constituted a verbal threat by Appellant to




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