Page 26 - TPA Journal July August 2024

was entitled to qualified immunity; (ii) Allemang’s offense.’” The facts must be known to the officer
vicarious liability claims; and (iii) Allemang’s at the time of the arrest; post-hoc justifications
defamation claim. Allemang sought to appeal based on facts later learned cannot post-rationalize
immediately, but we dismissed the appeal for lack an arrest. The facts also must be particularized to
of jurisdiction given that Allemang’s official- the arrestee. “We apply an objective standard,
capacity claim and several state tort claims which means that we will find that probable cause
remained pending. Some evidentiary wrangling existed if the officer was aware of facts justifying
followed the defendants’ second motion for a reasonable belief that an offense was being
summary judgment on Allemang’s remaining committed, whether or not the officer charged the
claims, with Allemang seeking to either depose arrestee with that specific offense.”
more troopers or to admit affidavits from two
retired State Police supervisors. The district court Allemang was arrested for driving while
struck those affidavits for, among other reasons, intoxicated. Under Louisiana law, one is guilty of
lack of relevancy. The district court then granted this offense if he or she operates any motor vehicle
the defendants’ second summary judgment motion while “under the influence of alcoholic beverages”
and dismissed Allemang’s remaining claims with or “one or more drugs,” even if those drugs are not
prejudice. This appeal followed. We have controlled substances. That is, Allemang need not
jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment specifically have been under the influence of
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. alcohol to violate the statute; impairment by
prescription or over-the-counter drugs would also
Allemang presents three overarching issues for our suffice. Allemang alleges two instances in which
review. First, he asserts that the district court Rogers acted without the requisite suspicion. First,
wrongly concluded that Rogers had reasonable he argues that Rogers lacked reasonable suspicion
suspicion to conduct the SFST or probable cause to administer the SFST. Second, he argues that
to arrest Allemang. Second, he says that the district Rogers lacked probable cause to arrest him based
court erred in dismissing his “Monell and Louisiana on his deficient SFST performance given Rogers’
negligent training/supervision liability claims.” knowledge of Allemang’s health conditions and
Third, he argues that the district court erred in Allemang’s clean Breathalyzer. We hold that
striking the affidavits from the retired State Allemang has not carried his burden of
Troopers. demonstrating a violation of a clearly established
right, and therefore Rogers is entitled to qualified
We start with the most crucial question: whether immunity.
Rogers violated Allemang’s constitutional rights by
subjecting him to a SFST and then by arresting him Rogers did not observe any deficiency in
despite Allemang’s explanation for his deficient Allemang’s driving. Rogers was brought to
SFST performance and clean Breathalyzer. The Allemang’s car after Allemang told another officer
constitutional tort of false arrest requires a showing that he (Allemang) had consumed four beers that
of no probable cause. “The Supreme Court has day, the first beer around noon, and the last beer
defined probable cause as the ‘facts and with his evening meal, around 9:30 p.m., about an
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that hour and half earlier. Allemang’s admission was
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one enough to justify administering the SFST, as
of reasonable caution, in believing, in the Louisiana courts have consistently held. Thus,
circumstances shown, that the suspect has Rogers had reasonable suspicion to ask Allemang
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an to submit to a SFST.

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