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or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation has intentionally or knowingly communicated in a
of a criminal statute.” We explained that “the “threatening or harassing manner” with another
community caretaker exception does not provide person in violation of a judicially issued protective
the government with refuge from the warrant order or bond condition.
requirement except when delay is reasonably
likely to result in injury or ongoing harm to the Wagner, appellant, was charged and convicted
community at large.” Courts have applied the under that statute after a jury determined that he
community caretaker exception in narrow communicated with his estranged wife, Laura, in a
instances when public safety is at risk. The City harassing manner in violation of a protective order
fails to carry its burden of establishing that the that had been issued against him for her protection
community caretaker exception applies in this due to a history of family violence. The court of
instance. First, on these facts, the City fails to appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction on direct
demonstrate how this search bears a relation to appeal over his challenge to the statute’s
public safety. The City does not show that the constitutionality on overbreadth and vagueness
location or length of time that Taylor’s vehicle grounds under the First and Fourteenth
was parked created the type of “hazard” or traffic amendments to the federal Constitution. We agree
impediment amounting to a public safety concern. with the court of appeals that the statute, if
Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning,
search would result in “injury or ongoing harm to is not overbroad because it does not reach a
the community.” To the contrary, at the time of the substantial amount of constitutionally protected
search, Taylor’s vehicle was lawfully parked in a speech, in that it applies only to a limited number
proper parking location, imposing no safety risk of people whose communications have been
whatsoever. Because the purpose of chalking is to restricted by a judge through a bond or protective
raise revenue, and not to mitigate public hazard, order, and it prohibits only communications that
the City was not acting in its “role as [a] are intentionally or knowingly made in a
community caretake[.]” threatening or harassing manner towards
particular protected individuals. We similarly
For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district conclude that the statute, as applied to appellant’s
court’s order granting the City’s motion to dismiss conduct, is not impermissibly vague because the
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent plain statutory terms are such that they would
with this order. afford a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know that his course of
Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-2126, 6th conduct would be prohibited. Accordingly, we
Circuit Court of Appeals, April 22, 2019. will affirm the court of appeals’s judgment
**************************************** upholding appellant’s conviction.
****************************************
************** Wagner v. State, No. PD-0659-15, Tex. Crim.
App. Feb. 14, 2018.
PEN. CODE SECTION 25.07 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL. SEARCH & SEIZURE – AFFIRMATIVE
In this case, we consider the constitutionality of LINK – CHECKPOINTS – STOP & FRISK.
Penal Code Section 25.07(a)(2)(A). Under that Bus stop search.
statute, the State may prosecute an individual who We REVERSE the district court’s decision to
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