Page 40 - May June 2020 TPA Journal
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or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation  has intentionally or knowingly communicated in a
        of a criminal statute.”   We explained that “the     “threatening or harassing manner” with another
        community caretaker exception does not provide       person in violation of a judicially issued protective
        the government with refuge from the warrant          order or bond condition.
        requirement except when delay is reasonably
        likely to result in injury or ongoing harm to the    Wagner, appellant, was charged and convicted
        community at large.”  Courts have applied the        under that statute after a jury determined that he
        community caretaker exception in narrow              communicated with his estranged wife, Laura, in a
        instances when public safety is at risk.  The City   harassing manner in violation of a protective order
        fails to carry its burden of establishing that the   that had been issued against him for her protection
        community caretaker exception applies in this        due to a history of family violence. The court of
        instance. First, on these facts, the City fails to   appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction on direct
        demonstrate how this search bears a relation to      appeal over his challenge to the statute’s
        public safety.  The City does not show that the      constitutionality on overbreadth and vagueness
        location or length of time that  Taylor’s vehicle    grounds under the First and Fourteenth
        was parked created the type of “hazard” or traffic   amendments to the federal Constitution.  We agree
        impediment amounting to a public safety concern.     with the court of appeals that the statute, if
        Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a        interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning,
        search would result in “injury or ongoing harm to    is not overbroad because it does not reach a
        the community.” To the contrary, at the time of the  substantial amount of constitutionally protected
        search, Taylor’s vehicle was lawfully parked in a    speech, in that it applies only to a limited number
        proper parking location, imposing no safety risk     of people whose communications have been
        whatsoever. Because the purpose of chalking is to    restricted by a judge through a bond or protective
        raise revenue, and not to mitigate public hazard,    order, and it prohibits only communications that
        the City was not acting in its “role as [a]          are intentionally or knowingly made in a
        community caretake[.]”                               threatening or harassing manner towards
                                                             particular protected individuals.  We similarly
        For the reasons above, we REVERSE the district       conclude that the statute, as applied to appellant’s
        court’s order granting the City’s motion to dismiss  conduct, is not impermissibly vague because the
        and REMAND for further proceedings consistent        plain statutory terms are such that they would
        with this order.                                     afford a person of ordinary intelligence a
                                                             reasonable opportunity to know that his course of
        Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-2126, 6th          conduct would be prohibited.  Accordingly, we
        Circuit Court of Appeals, April 22, 2019.            will affirm the court of appeals’s judgment
        ****************************************             upholding appellant’s conviction.
        ****************************************
        **************                                       Wagner v. State,  No. PD-0659-15,  Tex. Crim.
                                                             App.   Feb. 14, 2018.


        PEN.      CODE       SECTION         25.07    IS
        CONSTITUTIONAL.                                      SEARCH & SEIZURE –  AFFIRMATIVE
        In this case, we consider the constitutionality of   LINK – CHECKPOINTS – STOP & FRISK.
        Penal Code Section 25.07(a)(2)(A).  Under that       Bus stop search.
        statute, the State may prosecute an individual who    We REVERSE the district court’s decision to




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