Page 39 - TPA Journal November December2021

On October 15, 2020, the Magistrate Judge denied The qualified immunity inquiry includes two
Hodgkiss’s motion for summary judgment, which prongs: (1) “whether the officer’s alleged conduct
was based, in relevant part, on qualified has violated a federal right” and (2) “whether the
immunity. The Magistrate found that Davis and right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the
Saucedo had only pled facts “giving rise to one time of the alleged violation, such that the officer
legally cognizable claim”—a claim under Franks was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her
v. Delaware, based on Hodgkiss allegedly making conduct.” The officer will be entitled to qualified
false statements in his affidavit. With regard to that immunity if no constitutional violation occurred or
single claim, the Magistrate concluded both that (1) if the conduct “did not violate law clearly
there was an issue of material fact as to whether established at the time.” We have the “discretion to
Hodgkiss recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally decide which prong of the qualified-immunity
made material misstatements and (2) an affidavit analysis to address first.” Again, in reviewing
without those misstatements would not have shown the district court’s determinations on these two
probable cause to search the Saucedo residence. prongs, we “lack jurisdiction to resolve the
The Magistrate Judge thus denied Hodgkiss’s genuineness of any factual disputes” and may only
qualified immunity defense. This interlocutory consider “whether the district court erred in
appeal by Hodgkiss followed. assessing the legal significance of the conduct that
the district court deemed sufficiently supported for
It is necessary first to define the scope of our purposes of summary judgment.”
jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal. We may
exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal We focus our discussion on the first prong of the
of a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity analysis—whether Hodgkiss’s
qualified immunity only “to the extent that the alleged conduct violated a federal right. Plaintiffs
denial of summary judgment turns on an issue of have alleged a violation of their Fourth Amendment
law.” Indeed, “[w]henever the district court denies right, recognized by the Supreme Court in Franks
an official’s motion for summary judgment v. Delaware, to be free from
predicated upon qualified immunity, the district search pursuant to a warrant that lacks probable
court can be thought of as making two distinct cause due to knowing or reckless misstatements.
determinations, even if only implicitly.” The first
such determination is “that a certain course of To prove such a claim under Franks, plaintiffs must
conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively show that (1) the affidavit supporting a warrant
unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” contained false statements or material
The second is “that a genuine issue of fact exists omissions; (2) the affiant made such false
regarding whether the defendant(s) did, in fact, statements or omissions knowingly and
engage in such conduct.” We lack jurisdiction to intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
“review conclusions of the second type on truth; and (3) the false statements or material
interlocutory appeal.” Put another way, we lack omissions were necessary to the finding of
jurisdiction to hear challenges to “the district probable cause. As to the final element, falsehoods
court’s assessments regarding the sufficiency of the will be deemed necessary to the finding of probable
evidence.” However, we may consider the “purely cause if the affidavit, “with the . . . false material set
legal question” of “whether a given course of to one side,” is “insufficient to establish probable
conduct would be objectively unreasonable in light cause.”
of clearly established law.”

Nov.-Dec. 2021 www.texaspoliceassociation.com • (512) 458-3140 35