Page 26 - TPA Journal July-August 2025
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motion to suppress. The Third Court of Appeals       Eighteen years later, four judges on this Court rejected
        agreed with Appellant and reversed the judgment      the Third Court’s reasoning in Hernandez, construing
        of conviction. The court below decided this case     Section 545.060(a) as creating two separate offenses:
        prior to this Court’s opinion in  State v. Hardin    it is an offense to change marked lanes when it is
        (holding that subsection (a) of Section 545.060(a)   unsafe to do so; but it is also an independent offense to
        of the  Transportation Code creates only one         fail to remain entirely within a marked lane of traffic
        offense and that it is not a traffic violation to fail  so long as it remains practical to do so, regardless of
        to maintain a single marked lane of traffic if such  whether the deviation from the marked lane is, under
        failure does not occur in an unsafe manner).         the particular circumstances, unsafe.
        Therefore, the court of appeals reversed             Hardin – The Court of Criminal Appeals formally and
        Appellant’s conviction.                              authoritatively settles the debate: §545.060(a) estab-
        The basis offered by the State for the stop of       lishes a single offense, not two.
        Appellant’s vehicle was that the officer had rea-    In Hardin, this Court held that the officer had no rea-
        sonable suspicion that Appellant violated Section    sonable suspicion to stop the defendant when her vehi-
        545.060 of the Texas Transportation Code. That       cle’s right rear tire briefly touched the dividing line
        section provides, in pertinent part:                 between the center and right lane of traffic because the
        (a) An operator on a roadway divided into two or     State did not prove that the movement was unsafe.
        more clearly marked lanes for traffic:               When analyzing § 545.060(a)’s text, the Court
                                                             remarked that the operative terms of the statute—
        (1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely with-  “nearly,” “practical,” and “safely”—are “clear and
        in a single lane; and                                unambiguous” and
        (2) may not move from the lane unless that move-
        ment can be made safely.                             recognized that the dispute is over the number of
                                                             offenses.  Considering both subsections, the Court
        Since its enactment in 1995, interpretations of the  determined that a two-offense construction would ren-
        failure-to-maintain-single-lane statute (Section     der subsection (a)(1) unconstitutionally vague and
        545.060 of the Transportation Code) have varied      (a)(2) meaningless.
        amongst the intermediate courts.                     The  Hardin  Court distinguished the factual scenario
        The First, Second,  Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth,     presented in that case from the basis of the stop in
        Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals read    Leming, noting that the officer in Leming had reason-
        the failure to maintain a single lane statute as     able suspicion to stop the defendant for driving while
        requiring both: (1) the failure to drive “as nearly as  intoxicated regardless of whether he had failed to
        practical” in a single lane and (2) unsafe move-     maintain a single lane.
        ment when moving from a single lane.                 Judge Slaughter wrote separately to suggest that mis-
        Alternatively, the Seventh, Eighth,  Tenth,          take of law would apply, however, the State failed to
        Eleventh, and  Twelfth Courts of  Appeals have       raise the argument.  She also noted that reasonable
        interpreted subsection (a) as setting forth two      minds can disagree as to the meaning of the language
        offenses instead of one.                             in the statute and pointed to the dissent.  She further
        Hernandez – The Third Court of  Appeals holds        noted that there existed legitimate disagreements
        that § 545.060(a) creates a single offense.          among Texas courts as to the statutory interpretation
        In Hernandez, the State contended that a driver’s    which shows that the law was not as clear as the major-
        “drift” across a lane marker into another lane of    ity suggests.  And as Judge Slaughter recognized, the
        traffic traveling in the same direction, without any  Fifth Circuit has applied mistake of law to §
        evidence that the drifting was unsafe, gave an offi-  545.060(a) in U.S. v. Valenzuela Godinez.  There, the
        cer reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver  Fifth Circuit reasoned: “In light of the statute’s
        had violated Section 545.060(a).                     ambiguous text, coupled with the clear divide among




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