Page 131 - 2019 A Police Officers Guide

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the State need only prove the defendant harbored a
culpable mental state as to the underlying assault. Accordingly, even if Rodriguez reasonably
believed that his actions would cause only “simple” bodily injury, his mistake about the severity
of Francisco’s injuries did not negate any elemental mental state. A mistake-of-fact instruction
on these grounds would have been contrary to Section 8.02(a).

The court of appeals’ judgment is reversed, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Rodriguez v. State, No. PD-0439-16, Tex. Ct. Crim. App., Jan. 10, 2018.

PEN. CODE SECTION 25.07 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

In this case, we consider the constitutionality of Penal Code Section 25.07(a)(2)(A). Under that
statute, the State may prosecute an individual who has intentionally or knowingly communicated
in a “threatening or harassing manner” with another person in violation of a judicially issued
protective order or bond condition.
Wagner, appellant, was charged and convicted under that statute after a jury determined that he
communicated with his estranged wife, Laura, in a harassing manner in violation of a protective
order that had been issued against him for her protection due to a history of family violence. The
court of appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction on direct appeal over his challenge to the
statute’s constitutionality on overbreadth and vagueness grounds under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. We agree with the court of appeals that the statute, if
interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, is not overbroad because it does not reach a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, in that it applies only to a limited
number of people whose communications have been restricted by a judge through a bond or
protective order, and it prohibits only communications that are intentionally or knowingly made
in a threatening or harassing manner towards particular protected individuals. We similarly
conclude that the statute, as applied to appellant’s conduct, is not impermissibly vague because
the plain statutory terms are such that they would afford a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know that his course of conduct would be prohibited. Accordingly, we
will affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment upholding appellant’s conviction.

Wagner v. State, No. PD-0659-15, Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 2018.

OFFICIAL OPPRESSION – KNOWLEDGE OF ILLEGALITY REQUIRED.

In 2011 Appellant, Rebekah Thonginh Ross, worked as an investigator for the Greenville office
of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (hereinafter referred to as “the
Department” or “CPS”). In 2015, she was convicted of the offense of official oppression. The
charge was based on an allegedly unlawful search that Ross conducted pursuant to her duties as a
CPS investigator. Ross’s conviction was affirmed by the Sixth Court of Appeals. 2 We granted
Ross’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals correctly held
that the evidence was sufficient to support Ross’s conviction.

f.n.TEX. PENAL CODE § 39.03(a)(1) (providing that “[a] public servant acting under color of
[her]

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 123 2019 Edition