Page 37 - TPA Journal July August 2023
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required by law.”                                    As in the above cases, judicial estoppel is impli-
                                                             cated here. Regardless of whether Appellant invit-
        The majority’s rationale is problematic on two       ed the error, his present claim is “inconsistent”
        points. First, its conclusion that defense counsel   with his “prior conduct.”  Appellant “at the very
        was actually requesting “an instruction specifying   least” had “some responsibility for the jury
        that there must be evidence corroborating            instruction,” more than “just simply not objecting
        Hogarth’s testimony if the jury had a reasonable     to the charge or just stating ‘no objection’ to the
        doubt as to whether or not Hogarth was an accom-     charge.”  Instead, by taking issue with the reason-
        plice” is not supported by the record.  When         able doubt instruction that he specifically request-
        Appellant first objected and requested a reason-     ed, Appellant is presently asserting an inconsistent
        able-doubt instruction, the trial court responded    position and would derive an unfair advantage if
        that a reasonable-doubt instruction was in the jury  not estopped. More plainly,  Appellant is taking
        charge: “[I]t says in there they have to find that he  advantage of his own wrong.  Appellant accepted
        is an accomplice beyond a reasonable doubt.”         the reasonable doubt instruction. He did not
        However, counsel expressed that he did not think     remain silent on the issue, fail to object, state he
        such an instruction was in the charge: “But I don’t  had no objections to the charge, or withdraw his
        think there’s been an instruction that they need to  objection. Instead, he affirmatively communicated
        believe—when they consider accomplice, they          to the court that he was “good” with the instruc-
        have to agree beyond a reasonable doubt that he is   tion, thereby accepting the reasonable-doubt
        an accomplice. I don’t think that’s in here.” Once   instruction in the court’s jury charge. Appellant is
        more, the trial judge indicated that he “thought it  therefore estopped from bringing this jury instruc-
        was.” The instruction was then read verbatim by      tion complaint on appeal because by his objection,
        the State, and defense counsel said, “I’m good.”     request for a reasonable-doubt instruction, and
        The State then informed the trial judge which page   affirmative assent to the instruction, Appellant “at
        the instruction was on, and the judge said, “Yeah.   the very least” had “some responsibility” for the
        Okay. I thought it was in there.” While defense      error of which he now complains.
        counsel’s initial statement did refer to the lan-
        guage “if you have a reasonable doubt or not,”       The record reflects Appellant specifically asked
        counsel later clarified that he wanted an instruc-   the trial court to ensure that the jury be instructed
        tion “that they need to believe—when they con-       they had to agree “beyond a reasonable doubt”
        sider accomplice, they have to agree beyond a rea-   that Hogarth was an accomplice.  We hold that
        sonable doubt that he is an accomplice.” When he     Appellant, once he stated “I’m good” with the
        learned that this language was already in the        instruction, is estopped from thereafter claiming
        charge, he stated, “I’m good.”  The appellate        that the instruction was improper. We reverse the
        court’s conclusion that defense counsel was actu-    judgment of the court of appeals and remand the
        ally requesting a different charge is unpersuasive.  case to that court to address Appellant’s remaining
        Second, the appellate court erred when it insinuat-  points of error. We need not address the State’s
        ed that invited error is the sole form of estoppel.  remaining issues.
        To the contrary, while Appellant might not have
        invited error since the instruction was already in   Ruffins v. State, Tex. Ct. Crim. App., No. PD-
        the charge, invited error is only one form of estop-  0862-20, March 29, 2023.
        pel.  Under the more general principle of estoppel,
                                                             ****************************************
        “a party may be estopped from asserting a claim
                                                             ****************
        that is inconsistent with that party’s prior con-
        duct.”

        …



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