Page 161 - Texas police Association Peace Officer Guide 2017

Plaintiffs have failed to direct the Court to specific facts that could be interpreted by a reasonable
jury as showing that Defendant Thomas in fact drew the inference that Mr. Hyatt was an
imminent or high risk for suicide (requiring an even higher level of care and observation than
that which was being given him) or that Defendant Thomas deliberately ignored such a high
level of risk.
The district court therefore concluded that no genuine issue of material fact precluded Thomas
from being entitled to qualified immunity. This appeal followed.

The Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Although pretrial detainees like Hyatt are not protected by the Eighth
Amendment, we have held that “the State owes the same duty under the Due Process Clause and
the Eighth Amendment to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic
human needs, including medical care and protection from harm, during their confinement.”

[T]o be deliberately indifferent, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Therefore, to avoid liability, “[p]rison officials charged with deliberate indifference
might show . . . that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial
danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts
but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or
nonexistent.” Furthermore, evidence that an official was aware of a substantial risk to inmate
safety does not alone establish deliberate indifference. As the Supreme Court explained in
Farmer, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may
be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately
was not averted.” We have further observed that, “while . . . the law is clearly established that
jailers must take measures to prevent inmate suicides once they know of the suicide risk, we
cannot say that the law is established with any clarity as to what those measures must be.” What
is clear is that, even if an officer responds without the due care a reasonable person would use—
such that the officer is only negligent—there will be no liability.

On appeal, the Hyatts argue that the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to them,
suggests that Thomas: (1) knew that Hyatt was at significant risk of committing suicide; and (2)
ignored this risk when she failed to withhold or remove obvious dangers from Hyatt’s cell and
failed to follow Callahan County’s “suicide prevention policy.” We will consider each of these
arguments in turn.

In support of their contention that Thomas “knew Mr. Hyatt was at significant risk of committing
suicide,” the Hyatts point to evidence that she knew about Hyatt’s recent suicide attempt and his
history of depression; that she was told by Randi that Hyatt was suicidal; and that she did not
issue him certain items “due to his history of depression and suicide attempts.” We agree that,
taken in the light most favorable to the Hyatts, this evidence could lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that Thomas was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that Hyatt would attempt to
commit suicide.
“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.”

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 156 2017 Edition